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It comes down to the strength of our belief in the power of
the democratic idea. If we pursue a policy that cultivates
contacts . . . promotes commerce to our benefit, we could
help to create a climate for democratic change. No nation
on earth has discovered a way to import the world's goods
and services while stopping foreign ideas at the border....
We can advance our cherished ideas only by extending our
hand, showing our best side, sticking patiently to our
values.1
1. President George Bush, Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony
in New Haven, Connecticut, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 674 (May 27, 1991) (stating that
the Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status should continue for China), noted in Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992: Hearings and Markup on H.R. 4168 and H.R. 5323 Before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. 533 (1992)
(statement of Francisco Aruca, President, Marazul Charters, Inc.) [hereinafter Cuban De-
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I. INTRODUCTION
On New Year's Day 1959, Cuba's President Fulgencio Batista
fled the island.2 One week later, Fidel Castro marched trium-
phantly into Havana.' Since then, nine U.S. Presidents "have
maintained an invariable policy of more or less open hostility, as
well as a fierce economic blockade, and have persistently tried to
isolate Cuba politically and diplomatically-particularly from the
rest of Latin America.""
The most recent solidification of this policy occurred when
President Bush signed the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) on Octo-
ber 23, 1992.' The CDA tightens the present U.S. embargo6 against
Cuba by reimposing a thirty-two-year-old trade ban which previ-
ously prevented U.S. foreign subsidiaries from trading with Cuba.7
This latest step in U.S. foreign policy seeks "a peaceful transition
to democracy and a resumption of economic growth in Cuba
through the careful application of sanctions directed at the Castro
government and support for the Cuban people . . . ."
Cubans and other United States nationals have hailed the
CDA as the final phase in the long campaign of the United States
to oust Fidel Castro and return democracy to Cuba.' Other com-
mocracy Act House Hearings 1992].
2. PHILIP BRENNER, FROM CONFRONTATION TO NEGOTIATION: U.S. RELATIONS WITH CUBA
11 (1988).
3. Id.
4. CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY CONFRONTS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 65 (H. Michael Er-
isman & John M. Kirk eds., 1991).
5. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (to be codified at
22 U.S.C. § 6001); Peter Slevin, Bush Signs Law Aimed at Castro, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 24,
1992, at Al.
6. Some authorities have suggested that the term "embargo" is inappropriate for
describing the actions that the United States took toward Cuba in 1962. As one article
stated:
The U.S. action against Cuba, while denominated 'embargo' in official U.S. pub-
lications, can more properly be called an economic blockade: something more
than an embargo in that it is extended to imports and more than a boycott, in
that the United States attempted to control actions of third party states. For
this reason, the term 'economic blockade' will be employed here.
Paul A. Shneyer & Virginia Barta, The Legality of the U.S. Economic Blockade of Cuba
Under International Law, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 451, 452-53 (1981). This Comment
will use the term embargo because of its familiarity.
7. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6005(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993); see also Cuba Reacts Angrily to Tight-
ened U.S. Trade Sanctions, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, at A20.
8. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6002(1) (West Supp. 1993).
9. See generally Jorge Mas Canosa, Don't Ease Up On Castro, USA TODAY, Oct. 22,
1992, at A14 (letter to editor); Samuel A. Giberga, Blame Cuba's Dilemma on Castro, Not
1993]
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mentators have praised it for eliminating the loophole"0 in the pre-
sent U.S. embargo, which allowed U.S. foreign subsidiaries to trade
with Cuba.1"
This Comment maintains that the CDA is the latest of a series
of irrational attempts by the United States to oust Fidel Castro
and return democracy to Cuba. The United Nations General As-
sembly, as well as some of the United States' closest allies, have
denounced the CDA as a violation of international law because it
reimposes a ban on U.S. foreign-subsidiary trade with Cuba. " Fur-
ther, the CDA will have its harshest impact on the long-suffering
Cuban population, not on the object of the embargo-the Cuban
regime."3 This Comment concludes that the CDA, indeed, violates
the U.S., THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NOTPIC
File (letter to editor); Stephen S. Rosenfeld, No Place for Detente in Today's World, Hous-
TON CHRON., Sept. 19, 1992, at A32 (letter to editor); Marco A. Sainz Jr., New Cuban-Ameri-.
cans Also Oppose Castro; The True Bridges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at A22 (letter to
editor); Fiddling with the Cuban Constitution, WASH. TIMES, July 16, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, WTIMES File (letter to editor).
10. This exception was not a loophole, but rather a conscious decision by the United
States. Prior to the CDA, the United States banned all direct trade between U.S. companies
and Cuba. 31 C.F.R. § 515.541 (1992). However, there was an exception for foreign subsidi-
aries trading with Cuba, provided they obtained a license from the Treasury Department. 31
C.F.R. § 515.559(a) (1992). The United States allowed these licenses because of harsh inter-
national criticism the United States received regarding its regulation of foreign subsidiaries
when no licenses were available. See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
11. See Cuban Democracy Act House Hearings 1992, supra note 1, at 21 (statement of
Rep. Lawrence J. Smith); Arnold M. Zipper, Toward the Termination of Licensed U.S.
Foreign Subsidiary Trade with Cuba: The Legal and Political Obstacles, 23 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1045, 1045 (1992).
12. Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed
By The United States of America Against Cuba, G.A. Res. 19, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992). See U.N. Backs Cuba on U.S. Embargo,
WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1992, at A14; see also Latin Leaders Ask End of Embargo on Cuba,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1993, at L7 (stating that the leaders of Latin America, Spain, and
Portugal called for an end to the thirty-one-year-old U.S. embargo against Cuba); Frank
Rutter, Anti-Castro Legislation Putting Canada and U.S. on Collision Course, VANCOUVER
SUN, Oct. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, VANSUN File.
For an excellent compilation of the documents relating to the United Nations vote on
the CDA, see UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA; PROCEEDINGS IN THE
UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES 13-84 (Michael Krinsky & David Golove
eds., 1993) [hereinafter UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA].
13. See Song Xiaoping, Cuba Tackles Economic Challenges, BEIJING REV., Dec. 23,
1991, at 11; Cuba, Communism, Potatoes, ECONOMIST, May 16, 1992, at 51; Let Them Eat
Coconuts, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 1990, at 41; Making the Best of Cuba's Bad Job, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 26, 1991, at 37; Stoic to the Last, ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 1991, at 48; Tim Golden, Cas-
tro's People Try to Absorb 'Terrible Blows', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at Al; see also LYNN
GELDOF, VOICES OF CHANGE 1 (1992); Joanne Kenen, Cuba's "Special Period" Means Special
Hardship, REUTERS, Dec. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File; Jo
Thomas, The Last Days of Castro's Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, at 34.
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international law. Further, it fails to achieve even its most funda-
mental policy objectives because it will either strengthen, rather
than weaken, Castro's control over the Cuban people or lead to a
state of anarchy.
II. HiSTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Genesis of the Embargo
Despite the fact that Castro came to power in 1959, the
United States did not take its first steps toward an embargo until
1960. In May 1960, the United States ordered U.S. oil companies
in Cuba to refuse to refine Soviet crude1 ' because they were con-
cerned that Cuba was turning toward socialism. 5 When the
refineries refused to process Soviet oil, Castro responded by na-
tionalizing the refineries.1 " This nationalization and Cuba's grow-
ing connection with the Soviet Union caused President Eisenhower
to take the first step toward the implementation of the U.S. em-
bargo of Cuba.
17
On July 6, 1960, "President Dwight D. Eisenhower canceled
the 700,000 tons of sugar remaining in Cuba's 1960 quota under
the Sugar Act of 1948. ' 18 Following the cancelation of the sugar
quota, nearly all trade between the United States and Cuba ended,
and a de facto economic embargo was created.19
On February 6, 1962, President Kennedy imposed a formal
trade embargo between the United States and Cuba,2 ° issuing
Presidential Proclamation No. 3447.21 President Kennedy reasoned
14. BRENNER, supra note 2, at 12-13.
15. There were several reasons for U.S. concern that Cuba was becoming socialist as
early as 1960. First, Castro had come to power through a revolution, and in May, only five
months after taking power, he carried out his promise of agrarian reform by passing the first
Agrarian Reform Law, nationalizing approximately one-third of the "arable land in Cuba."
Id. at 98. Second, in February of 1960, Soviet Foreign Minister Anastas Mikoyan visited
Cuba and signed trade and aid agreements which led to Cuba and the Soviet Union estab-
lishing full diplomatic relations on May 8, 1960. Id.; see also Department Reports on Cuban
Threats to the Western Hemisphere, 46 DEP'T ST. BULL. 129 (1962) (discussing Cuba's ex-
tensive ties with the Sino-Soviet Bloc).
16. SEIs LEYES DE LA REVOLUcI6N 49 (1976); see also BRENNER, supra note 2, at 98.
17. See President Sets Cuba Sugar Quota at Zero for First Quarter of 1961, 44 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 18 (1961).
18. Id.
19. BRENNER, supra note 2, at 13.
20. Id.
21. 3 C.F.R. 157 (1959-63 comp.), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. app. § 2370 (1988).
19931
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1
that such an embargo was necessary because the Cuban govern-
ment was at odds with the "principles and objectives of the Inter-
American system," and Cuba's alignment with the Soviet powers
posed a security risk for the United States as well as the Western
Hemisphere.22
B. Legal Framework
The legal authority for the embargo is from section 620(a) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 196123 which provides that:
[n]o assistance shall be furnished under this Act to the present
government of Cuba. As an additional means of implementing
and carrying into effect the policy of the preceding sentence, the
President is authorized to establish and maintain a total em-
bargo on all trade between the United States and Cuba.24
Although the Act granted presidential authority to implement an
embargo, it did not grant statutory authority for the accompanying
regulations necessary to implement such an embargo. 25 Presiden-
tial Proclamation No. 344726 divided administrative responsibility
for implementing the trade embargo between the Commerce De-
partment, which controls exports of goods produced in the United
States27 to Cuba, 2  and the Treasury Department, which controls
22. Id.
23. Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 620(a), 75 Stat. 424, 444-45 (1962).
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. 3 C.F.R. 157 (1959-63 comp.), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. app. § 2370 (1988).
27. Goods produced in the United States include, "goods and technical data of United
States origin, components of United States origin to be incorporated into goods assembled
or manufactured abroad, and goods to be produced abroad from technical data of United
States origin." Marlene Hammock, Comment, U.S. Prohibitions on Cuban Trade: Are They
Effective?, 1 FLA. INT'L L.J. 61, 62 (1984) (citing Address by Stanley L. Sommerfield, Acting
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control 4 (Apr. 25, 1974)).
28. The Commerce Department has control over the exportation of U.S. goods pro-
duced in the United States only. "The Commerce Department has no legal power to control
goods or data produced abroad by subsidiaries or by other American-controlled firms, nor
does it have power to control purely financial transactions." Stanley L. Sommerfield, Trea-
sury Regulations Affecting Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and Cuba, 19 Bus. LAW. 861
(1964). The Treasury Department has power over those transactions by "virtue of the au-
thority delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury under Section 5(b) of the Trading with
the Enemy Act, as amended (50 U.S.C. app. 5(b), and Executive Order No. 9193)." Id.
This Comment focuses on the Treasury Department regulations, and analyzes the effect
of the CDA on U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba. For a discussion of the Commerce
Department Controls, see Hammock, supra note 27; Peter J. Grilli et al., Legal Impedi-
ments to Normalization of Trade With Cuba, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1007, 1023 (1976).
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importation of Cuban-origin goods and goods imported from or
through Cuba. 9
1. Treasury Department Controls
On March 23, 1962, the Treasury Department issued the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR).30 The CACR con-
trolled "purely financial transactions, the importation of Cuban
goods, Cuban assets in the United States, and goods produced by
foreign firms which were owned or controlled by U.S. firms." s'
These regulations, patterned after the Foreign Assets Control Reg-
ulations (FACR), 2 prohibited trade by persons subject to U.S.
jurisdiction."3
2. The CACR Exception
However, the CACR differed from the FACR regulations in
one major respect. The CACR, unlike the FACR, expressly ac-
cepted and, therefore, allowed transactions by any non-banking
corporation both chartered and conducting business in a foreign
29. 3 C.F.R. 157 (1959-63 comp.), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. app. § 2370 (1988).
30. The legal authority for the CACR regulations is Presidential Proclamation 3447 and
section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA). 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)
(1988). Under section 5(b) of the TWEA, the President has authority to issue regulations
during wartime or a presidentially declared national emergency. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1990).
The legal justification for the Cuban embargo was the national emergency declared by
President Harry S. Truman in 1950, the Korean conflict. Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99
(1950). Although more than forty-years-old, the emergency is still in effect as it has never
been terminated by the President, Congress, or the courts. See Sardino v. Federal Reserve
Board, 361 F.2d 106, 109 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
31. Hammock, supra note 27, at 64 (citing Stanley L. Sommerfield, Acting Director of
the Office of Foreign Assets Control (Apr. 25, 1974)).
32. 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1992). Compare the similarity between 31 C.F.R. § 515.329
(1992) (CACR definition of person subject to jurisdiction) with 31 C.F.R. § 500.329 (1992)
(FACR definition of person subject to jurisdiction). See the similarity between 31 C.F.R.
§ 515.201 (1992) (CACR prohibitions) and 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1992) (FACR prohibitions).
33. The regulations define a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as:
(a) Any individual, wherever located, who is a citizen or resident of the United
States;
(b) Any person within the United States as defined in § 515.329;
(c) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any
State, territory, possession, or district of the United States; and
(d) Any corporation, partnership, or association, wherever organized or doing
business, that is owned, or controlled by persons specified in paragraph (a) or (c)
of this section.
31 C.F.R. § 515.329 (1992).
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country."4 The CACR regulations created this exception to avert
the difficulties with foreign subsidiaries that the United States
originally experienced with foreign countries when it first applied
the FACR regulations to them. 5 The exception, however, turned
out to be no exception at all. It quickly plunged the United States
into major foreign policy difficulties.
From its very inception, the Treasury Department limited the
exception's scope and application. 6 For instance, the exception
was not deemed applicable to businesses involved in U.S. merchan-
dise, financing, or vessels owned or controlled by U.S.
corporations.37
Most notably, while the language of subsection (e) does not
prescribe any person engaged in trade having "a financial
interest,"3 8 the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has inter-
preted that subsection to, nevertheless:
prohibit[ ] an American citizen who was an officer or director or
otherwise ... actually or potentially in control of a foreign firm
from engaging in unlicensed trade with Cuba. Inaction by a per-
son in control was regarded as a violation. In other words, if an
American was actually or potentially able to control a foreign
firm's trade with Cuba he was required to do so.s
Thus, while the exception expressly allowed for transactions be-
tween Cuba and non-banking corporations, OFAC's narrow con-
struction of the exception effectively made it non-existent.
Furthermore, it was clear that the United States, irrespective
of the exception, still had every intention of prohibiting foreign
34. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.541 (1975) (revoked by 40 Fed. Reg. 41,108 (1975)).
35. Harold J. Berman & John R. Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Pre-
sent, and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 869 (1967); James I. Corcoran, The Trading with
the Enemy Act and the Controlled Canadian Corporation, 14 McGILL L.J. 174, 185 (1968);
Sommerfield, supra note 28, at 868.
36. See Robert B. Thompson, United States Jurisdiction Over Foreign Subsidiaries:
Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 319, 331 n.44 (1983)
(quoting Letter from Stanley Sommerfield, former Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control, to Robert B. Thompson, (Mar. 28, 1963)).
37. 31 C.F.R. § 515.541(c) & (d) (revoked by 40 Fed. Reg. 41,108 (1975)).
38. 31 C.F.R. § 515.541(e) (revoked by 40 Fed. Reg. 41,108 (1975)).
39. Thompson, supra note 36, at 331 n.44 (quoting Letter from Stanley Sommerfield,
former Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, to Robert B. Thompson, (Mar. 28,
1963)). Commentators have criticized this interpretation as "strained" and "rather slim
ground with which to establish a violation." Id. See William L. Craig, Application of the
Trading with The Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations Owned By Americans: Reflections
On Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REV. 579, 600 (1970); Corcoran, supra note 35, at 182.
[Vol. 25:1
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trade-even with foreign subsidiaries meeting the requirements of
the CACR exception. Stanley Sommerfield, chief counsel of the
Treasury Department's OFAC, stated, for example, that "[i]f it de-
velops that a substantial amount of trade is being conducted by
subsidiaries with Cuba (and constant checks are being made on
this point) then the exemption will be reconsidered."' 0
The Treasury Department also tried to prohibit foreign-sub-
sidiary trade through its "voluntary compliance" program." Under
this program, compliance was not, in fact, voluntary; it was co-
erced.42 The United States informed the parent corporation that
trade with Cuba violated U.S. foreign policy as well as the national
interest, regardless of its legality.4" Where "informing" the parent
corporation proved to be inadequate, the U.S. government resorted
to:
threats of adverse publicity against the parent in the United
States. In this regard it is understandable that an American cor-
poration would prefer the American purchasing public not know
its foreign subsidiary has been trading with... [Cuba]. Sales are
likely to take a sharp drop. Similarly, the authorities may
threaten future difficulties in securing governmental contracts.
Considering the size of the Federal budget, this could be a harsh
blow to any corporation [accustomed] to a share of the pie.
While both these methods are non-statutory, the strength of the
pressure they exert for compliance must be recognized. 44
Thus, the "voluntary compliance" program, the threat of the
exception's revocation, the statutory exemption's narrowness, and
the broad interpretation of the exceptions to the exemption suc-
cessfully prohibited U.S. foreign subsidiaries from trading with
Cuba.4 5 But rather than accept the U.S. prohibitions, the host
countries objected to these actions as a threat to their sovereignty
40. Sommerfield, supra note 28, at 868.
41. Corcoran, supra note 35, at 181; Hammock, supra note 27, at 66-67; Sommerfield,
supra note 28, at 868; Thompson, supra note 36, at 330.
42. Corcoran, supra note 35, at 181; Hammock, supra note 27, at 66-67.
43. Hammock, supra note 27, at 66 n.45 (quoting Address by Stanley L. Sommerfield,
acting director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (Apr. 25, 1974)).
44. Jack W. Hodges, Comment, The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and Foreign-
Based Subsidiaries of American Multinational Corporations: A Time to Abstain from Re-
straining, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 206, 218-19 (1973); see also, Berman & Garson, supra note
35, at 870 (discussing a successful compliance action in July 1966 in which three flour firms
canceled their contract to mill Canadian wheat destined for Cuba); Corcoran, supra note 35,
at 180.
45. Thompson, supra note 36, at 330 n.42.
1993]
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and a violation of international law.46
C. U.S. Policy and Resulting Problems with U.S. Foreign
Subsidiaries
1. International Conflicts Prior to July 29, 1975
The United States' successful prohibition of U.S. foreign sub-
sidiary trade with Cuba led to serious international conflicts for
the United States, especially with Canada. 47 These conflicts evi-
denced the foieign countries' view that the enforcement of this
prohibition was a threat to their sovereignty. 48 They also illus-
trated the serious economic consequences that such prohibitions
could have for the host country.49
For instance, in March 1974, MLW-Worthington, 50 a Cana-
dian firm, negotiated a contract with Cuba for approximately fif-
teen million dollars to provide thirty diesel locomotives and to re-
furbish existing ones. 1 The agreement would have resulted in one
and one-half million hours of work for the Canadian plant and its
suppliers.52 The Canadian government and the Canadian directors
of MLW-Worthington protested the application of the CACR reg-
ulations as a violation of Canadian sovereignty because of the pos-
sible delay that applying for a Treasury license could cause. 3 As
the Canadian government stated in a note to the United States:
'The Canadian government holds that the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations of the U.S.A. should not be given effect in Canada
through the parent-subsidiary relationship or in any other way.
46. See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
47. See Hammock, supra note 27, at 67-69. For a thorough discussion of all incidents
between the United States and Canada with regard to the Cuban Assets Regulations, see
A.L.C. DE MESTRAL & T. GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF EXPORT
CONTROL LEGISLATION: CANADA AND THE U.S.A. 161-70 (1990); Hammock, supra note 27, at
67-69.
48. See Hammock, supra note 27, at 68.
49. See Locomotive Sale to Cuba Verified, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1974, at 47 (stating
that one sale to Cuba was valued at $15 million and would generate 1.5 million hours of
work for a Canadian Plant); Jonathan Kandell, 200-Man Argentine Mission in Cuba For
the Start of $1-Billion Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1974, at 30 (discussing a sale by
American automobile subsidiaries to Cuba valued between $130 and $150 million).
50. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc. of New Jersey controlled MLW-Worthington. Stude-
baker-Worthington owned 59% of the stock of the company. MORRIS H. MORLEY, IMPERIAL
STATE THE UNITED STATES AND REVOLUTION AND CUBA, 1952-1986, at 274-75 (1987).
51. Locomotive Sale to Cuba Verified, supra note 49, at 47.
52. Id.
53. See A.L.C. DE MESTRAL & GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 47, at 166.
[Vol. 25:1
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. . the Canadian Government wishes to emphasize the signifi-
cance of this issue and to urge the U.S.A. Government to remove
on an urgent basis any restraint on the directors or officers of
MLW-Worthington, who are also U.S.A. citizens, which might
interfere with the proposed sale of the Canadian company.'
54
MLW-Worthington completed the contract without U.S. approval
and over the objection of two U.S. directors. 5 The United States
eventually granted a waiver for the sale, but this was apparently
connected with a similar problem that the United States was hav-
ing with Argentina. 6
Argentine executives of two U.S. foreign automobile subsidiar-
ies, Ford and Chrysler, travelled to Cuba during the early part of
1974 to negotiate a possible sale of 44,000 vehicles worth between
$130 and $150 million. 7 The Argentine government stated that it
would consider any U.S. attempt to block the sale a violation of
Argentine sovereignty. 8 Argentina threatened to nationalize the
plants involved and to proceed independently to fulfill the con-
tract.6 The United States responded by granting Argentina a spe-
cial license, in the "interest of good relations with Argentina."6
The United States again deferred to foreign pressure during a
third incident, the Litton affair, in 1974. Late in 1974, a Canadian
subsidiary of Litton Industries, a U.S. corporation, asked whether
the Treasury Department would prohibit a proposed furniture con-
tract with Cuba.' When the Treasury Department stated that it
could deny such an application as violative of the regulations, the
U.S. parent company canceled the sale.2 In response, the Cana-
54. Id. at 166 (quoting Note from Canada to the U.S. State Department (Jan. 13,
1974)). In addition to sending the note, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau indirectly
threatened to withdraw federal orders and subsidies to MLW-Worthington. MORLEY, supra
note 50, at 276.
55. Canada Prefers To Deal Without U.S. Interference, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1974, at
3.
56. Id. Another writer declared that "the U.S. government... chose[] simply to ignore
the transaction, rather than precipitate a confrontation with the Canadian government."
MORLEY, supra note 50, at 276 (quoting U.S. Easing of Cuba Trade Embargo Is Limited,
Bus. INT'L, May 10, 1974, at 151).
57. Kandell, supra note 49, at 6.
58. Chairs for Castro, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1974, at 30. See MORLEY, supra note 50, at
274-75.
59. Chairs for Castro, supra note 58, at 30.
60. Id.; see also Economic Sanctions, 1974 DIGEST § 12, at 604.
61. William Borders, U.S. Subsidiary in Canada Forced to Drop Cuba Deal, N.Y.




dian government pressured the United States to allow the sale on
the grounds that Canadian companies should be governed by
Canadian, not United States, law.13 The United States again re-
lented.64 These direct foreign policy conflicts made it clear that
U.S. policy had to change, and an opportunity arose shortly after
the Litton affair.8
2. July 29, 1975: Change of Policy or More of the Same
The United States found an opportunity to change its policy
toward control of third-country exports to Cuba in 1975. On July
29th, the Organization of American States (OAS)"6 voted to re-
move economic and political sanctions against Cuba and to allow
each signatory country to decide for itself its economic and diplo-
matic relations with Cuba. 7 The United States changed its policy
on subsidiary trade, primarily because of pressure from U.S. allies
which had complained about the extra-territorial application of
purely domestic U.S. trade regulations. S
The United States responded to the OAS resolution by an-
nouncing that it would license U.S. subsidiaries to trade with Cuba
when the policy of the host country permitted such trade.6 9 Such
63. Id.
64. See Hammock, supra note 27, at 69.
65. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger commented on March 1, 1975, that the
United States was "'prepared to move in a new direction'" in its policy toward Cuba.
BRENNER, supra note 2, at 101. Those statements preceded, by three months, the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) vote to lift the diplomatic and economic sanctions against
Cuba. Id.
66. On July 26, 1964, the OAS adopted a trade resolution that banned all trade with
Cuba " 'whether direct or indirect'" except food and medicine. Final Act, Ninth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Serving as Organ of Consultation in Applica-
tion of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, OEA/ser.C/II.9, doc. 48, rev. 2
(1964); MESTRAL & GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 47, at 163.
67. Final Act, Sixteenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serv-
ing as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (TIAR), July 29, 1975, OEA/ser.F/II doc. 9/75 rev. 2 (1975); Freedom of Action
of the States Parties to the Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to Normalize
or Conduct Their Relations with the Republic of Cuba at the Level and in the Form that
Each State Deems Advisable, (July 29, 1975), reprinted in ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: TREATIES CONVENTIONS & OTHER DOCUMENTS, vol. 1,
pt. II, 348-49 (1983).
68. DONNA R. KAPLOWITZ & MICHAEL KAPLOWITZ, NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S.-CUBAN
TRADE 11 (1992) (available from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Stud-
ies, Johns Hopkins University) (quoting interview with Catherine Mann, U.S. Treasury De-
partment (July 19, 1988)).
69. U.S. Takes Steps To Conform with OAS Action on Cuba, 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 404
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authorized trade included both exportation of commodities pro-
duced in the host country7 ° and importation of goods of Cuban ori-
gin.71 Although licenses now could be granted, the United States
would continue to enforce its existing restrictions on goods con-
taining components of U.S. origin, financing, strategic goods, or
technology.
72
Fifteen months later, the United States restricted the regula-
tions.73 They did so by licensing only those foreign subsidiaries en-
gaging in trade with Cuba that were, in all respects, independent
of their parent corporation. In other words, "the affiliate must be
generally independent, in the conduct of transactions of the type
for which the license is being sought, in such matters as decision-
making, risk-taking, negotiation, financing or arranging for financ-
ing, and performance."74 The new restriction, in essence, sought to
prevent U.S. firms from manipulating the CACR regulations
through their foreign subsidiaries.
7
5
The new regulations even prevented "subsidiaries that were
separately incorporated but nevertheless not independent from the
U.S. parent in either their decision-making or key personnel"7 6
(1975).
70. 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(a)(1), (3) (1992).
71. 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(a)(3) (1992).
72. Id.
73. 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(c) (1992).
74. The new regulation provided that:
IsIpecific licenses issued pursuant to the policies set forth in this section do not
authorize any person within the United States to engage in, participate in, or be
involved in a licensed transaction with Cuba or Cuban nationals. Such involve-
ment includes, but not by way of limitation, assistance or participation by a U.S.
parent firm, or any officer or any officer or employee thereof, in the negotiation
or performance of a transaction which is the subject of license application. Such
participation is a ground for denial of a license application, or for revocation of a
license. To be eligible for a license under this section, the affiliate must be gener-
ally independent, in the conduct of transactions of the type for which the license
is being sought, in such matters as decision-making, risk-taking, negotiation, fi-
nancing or arranging of financing, and performance. For purposes of this section,
an affiliate is not independent if there are a substantial number of officers or
directors of the foreign affiliate who are also officers or directors of a person
within the United States.
31 C.F.R. § 515.559(c) (1992).
The regulations defined "persons within the United States" as
"[a]ny partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, wheresoever organized,
or doing business, which is owned or controlled by a person or persons specified in
paragraphs (a)(1), (2) or (3) of this section." 31 C.F.R. § 515.330 (1992).
75. See Thompson, supra note 36, at 332.
76. Id. at 333.
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from trading with Cuba. These restrictions,77 along with falling
world sugar prices, 78 helped to prevent the subsidiaries from taking
advantage of the new regulations.79
In 1978 and 1979, the United States almost completely re-
pealed the subsidiary exemption because of Cuba's African activi-
ties."0 In 1979, Congress responded to the Cuban military's increas-
ing activity in Africa,"1  by passing the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act,8 2 calling upon the President to review diplo-
matic and economic relations with Cuba.83 The Act's preface "spe-
cifically referred to the president's ability under the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1969 to limit Cuban trade with foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. firms."8 4 However, "[tihe Carter administra-
tion opposed these efforts, asserting that attempts to exert greater
extraterritorial control over foreign subsidiaries would irritate Ca-
nada and Mexico and damage 'important bilateral economic un-
derstandings.',85 The Carter administration fully recognized other
77. For a discussion of examples of the strict enforcement of the new control restric-
tions as applied to Canadian firms, see MESTRAL & GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 47, at
168.
78. In response to high world sugar prices, Cuba increased its trade with Western coun-
tries from 594 million pesos in 1970 to 2.07 billion pesos in 1975. KIRBY JONES & DONNA
RICH, OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S.-CUBAN TRADE 11 (1988) (available from Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity School of Advanced International Studies). However, Cuba soon learned that it had
overextended itself while sugar prices were high. Id. As prices dropped so did Cuba's total
trade with the West, falling to 1.5 billion pesos in 1976 and then to 967 million pesos in
1978. Id. This decline in sugar prices and hence total foreign trade with the West by Cuba
limited, at least initially, the possible advantages that U.S. foreign subsidiaries could gain
from the new regulations.
Kirby Jones, in her study of United States-Cuban trade, notes that the high levels of
expenditures by Cuba between 1970 and 1975 show that "when possible Cuba chooses to
trade with the West," rather than the Soviet Union. Id. at 5, 11.
79. KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 60; David Leyton-Brown, Extraterrito-
riality in Canadian-American Relations, 36 INT'L J. 185, 188 (1980-81) (Can.).
80. From 1975 through 1978, Cuba became heavily involved in Africa. BRENNER, supra
note 2, at 101-02. On November 5, 1975, Cuba sent a battalion of troops to Angola to help
repel an invasion by South African forces. Id. at 101. In May of 1977, the State Department
received reports that Cuban military advisors had arrived in Ethiopia. Id. at 102. In 1978,
the State Department "charged that Cuban troops in Angola were involved in training and
encouraging the Katangese rebels in Zaire's Shaba province." Id.
81. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 963, 990
(1978).
82. Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 963 (1978).
83. Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 963, 990 (1978).
84. Thompson, supra note 36, at 333 n.54. For a discussion of the Export Administra-
tion Act, see Thompson, supra note 36, at 333 nn.109-18 and accompanying text.
85. U.S. SENATE, REPORTS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1979, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 125-33.
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countries' views, particularly those of our allies, that the imposi-
tion of the United States-Cuban trade regulations on foreign sub-
sidiaries constituted nothing less than a serious infringement upon
their sovereignty.
3. U.S. Foreign Subsidiary Trade Following the Carter
Administration
From the Reagan administration's inception, it "pursue[d] a
more hostile policy toward Cuba than [the] Carter [administra-
tion]," which never excluded military action.86 This shift toward a
more hostile policy included tightening the embargo against
Cuba7.8  Notwithstanding the new administration's efforts to
tighten this embargo, 88 licensed U.S. subsidiary trade did not de-
cline 9 in the Reagan era.
In fact, during the Reagan administration, U.S. licensed for-
eign subsidiary trade increased from $209 million in 1981 to $306.5
million in 1987.90 Most of the exports from U.S. subsidiaries to
Cuba consisted of grain, wheat, or other consumable items."' Thus,
even before the Soviet Union's collapse, Cuba had turned to the
West, including U.S. foreign subsidiaries, to obtain essential
86. MORLEY, supra note 50, at 320. For a thorough discussion of the relations between
the United States and Cuba during the Reagan administration, see id., at 317-66; WAYNE S.
SMITH, THE CLOSEST OF ENEMIES 238-66 (1987).
87. MORLEY, supra note 50, at 337.
88. These steps included re-imposing the 1963 travel restrictions and refusing visas to
Cuban officials. See Hammock, supra note 27, at 74. In addition, the Reagan administration
required companies that shipped products containing nickel to the U.S. to certify that the
nickel was not of Cuban origin. KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 62. Most signifi-
cant was the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Treasury Department's publication
for "the first time [of] a 'partial listing of persons and firms who are specially designated
nationals under the Treasury Department's Foreign Assets Control Regulations,' " in order
to prevent further transactions with these firms. Id. See MORLEY, supra note 50, at 338-39.
These firms were suspected of being fronts set up by the embargoed countries in order to
circumvent the embargo. Id. Although this list was supposed to be for all Treasury Depart-
ment Asset Control Regulations, it clearly aimed at stiffening Cuban trade. The list in-
cluded 167 firms to be designated Cuban nationals, one for Cambodia, and zero for North
Korea or Vietnam. See KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 62.
89. See KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 72.
90. OFFICE OF FOREIGN AssETs CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, SPECIAL
REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF LICENSED TRADE WITH CUBA BY FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES OF U.S. COM-
PANIES 5 (1992) [hereinafter SPECIAL TREASURY REPORT ON FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY TRADE WITH
CUBA].
91. A sampling of U.S. subsidiary exports to Cuba between 1980 and 1988 showed that
the percentage of consumable exports fluctuated between 93.2% in 1980 to 57.73% in 1988.




Licensed U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba increased
sharply at the end of the 1980s, 91 with the collapse of communism
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 4 As trade between Cuba
and the former Soviet Union dwindled, U.S. foreign subsidiary
trade grew to counter-balance the shortage. Between 1988 and
1989, U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba increased from
$232.7 million to $331.9 million. 5 From 1989 to 1990, it more than
doubled to $705.3 million dollars.9 6
Exports to Cuba rose from less than $100 million in 1988 to
more than $500 million in 1990.97 The trade increase did not con-
sist of durable goods, but rather food and medicine from U.S.
foreign subsidiaries.9 8 In 1990, grain, wheat, and other consumables
comprised approximately ninety-four percent of the $533 million
goods exported to Cuba from U.S. subsidiaries. 9 This three-fold
increase over 1988 directly resulted from the Soviet Union's and
Comecon's collapse.10
Despite extra foodstuff imports from U.S. foreign subsidiaries,
the Cuban people have suffered.1 01 In 1990, Castro announced the
beginning of the "'Special Period in Time of Peace.' "o102 This ex-
pression does not symbolize the improved well-being that new
peace brings, but rather "heightened austerity and rationing." 10 3 In
the words of one author, the "Special Period" only represents
"Special Hardship. 1 0 4 "Many Cubans have lost 20 or 30 pounds
. . . over the past year or so, both because food is scarcer and be-
92. See KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 2-3; see generally id. at 12 (listing a
partial list of goods sold to Cuba by U.S. subsidiaries from 1985-91).
93. Id. at 11.
94. EDWARD GONZALEZ & DAVID RONFELDT, CUBA ADRIFT IN A POSTCOMMUNIST WORLD,
at v. (1992) (available from the Rand Corporation in Washington).
95. SPECIAL TREASURY REPORT ON FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY TRADE WITH CUBA, supra note 90,
at 5.
96. Id.
97. KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 70.
98. CUBA'S TIES TO A CHANGING WORLD 233 (Donna Rich Kaplowitz ed., 1993);
KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 11.
99. CUBA'S TIES TO A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 98, at 233; KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ,
supra note 68, at 11.
100. CUBA'S TIES TO A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 98, at 233; KAPLOWITZ &
KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 11.
101. See supra note 13; see also infra notes 281-86 and accompanying text.
102. GONZALEZ & RONFELDT, supra note 94, at v.
103. Id.
104. Kenen, supra note 13.
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cause fuel shortages mean they walk or ride bicycles instead of
driving a car or taking a bus.'11 5 According to a newspaper report
issued in late December 1992, beef or pork has not been available
to Cubans in one year, and many of the foodstuffs that are sup-
posed to be available are never distributed.106
The suffering in Cuba is attributed, at least in part, to U.S.
policy there. President Clinton, 107 former President Bush, 08 and
the United States Congress' °9 apparently believe the best way to
bring about a "peaceful transition to democracy and a resumption
of economic growth"" 0 in Cuba is to cut off shipments of food-
stuffs and medicine by tightening the existing embargo, thus, the
Cuban Democracy Act."'
III. THE CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT: BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND
POLICY
A. Background
The saga of the Cuban Democracy Act began in 1989 when
Senator Connie Mack of Florida introduced the Mack Amend-
ment." 2 This Amendment, which became part of the CDA, called
for a ban on U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba."' However,
the CDA would never have become law without the influence of a
powerful domestic Cuban lobbying group, the Cuban American
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. President Clinton not only supported the CDA before the Act was denounced by
the United Nations, Larry Rohter, The 1992 Campaign: Florida; Clinton Sees Opportunity
to Break G.O.P. Grip on Cuban-Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1992, at A6, but afterwards
as well. UN Setback 'Will Not Change' Washington's Policy on Cuba, LATIN AMERICA RE-
GIONAL REPORTS: CARIBBEAN & CENTRAL AMERICA, Jan. 21, 1993, at 8.
108. Bush signed the CDA on October 23, 1992. See Peter Slevin, Bush Signs Law
Aimed at Castro, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 24, 1992, at Al.
109. Guy Gugliotta, House Stiffens Trade Limits Against Cuba; New Sanctions Aim
To Pressure Castro, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1992, at A15.
110. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (West Supp. 1993).
111. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6005(a) (West Supp. 1993) provides that transactions between cer-
tain United States firms and Cuba are prohibited "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law, no license may be issued for any transaction described in section 515.559 of title 31,
Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on July 1, 1989."
112. See Pamela Fessler & John Felton, Senators Use Bill as a Forum for Foreign
Policy Views, 47 CONG. Q. 1879, 1882 (1989).
113. See KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 15; Fessler & Felton, supra note
112, at 1882. Compare KAPLOWrrz & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 15 with 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 6005(a) (West Supp. 1993).
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National Foundation (CANF)." 4
In 1981, the CANF was formed to organize Cubans and bring
their political influence to Washington. 1 5 Because of their power
in Washington, the CANF and its Chairman, Jorge Mas Canosa, 1" 6
were able to ensure passage of the CDA through Congress.' 1 7
The CANF's power comes from enormous political action com-
mittee contributions to political campaigns. 1 8 This money has
bought the CANF power, that brought about the creation of Radio
and TV Marti, and regulations limiting the amount of money that
Cuban exiles can send to relatives back home."1 9
These campaign contributions were especially important in
1992 because it was an election year. From its inception, the
CANF, through its directors and the Free Cuba Political Action
Committee (PAC), has donated more than one million dollars to
candidates in both the Senate and the House.' 20 The Free Cuba
PAC donated more than $200,000 in the 1992 election year, alone,
including $26,750 to Representative Robert Torricelli who became
the CDA's House sponsor.' 2'
In fact, the CANF was so powerful that members of Congress
supported the CDA even though their aides "ridiculed the bill pri-
vately as 'a dog' and a 'throwback to the 1960s.' "22 According to
at least one Congressional aide, Democrats supported the bill only
to put the Bush Administration "'on the wrong side' of the Foun-
114. See Elizabeth A. Palmer, Exiles Talk of PACs and Power Not Another Bay of
Pigs, 48 CONG. Q. 1929, 1929 (1990); Larry Rohter, A Rising Cuban-American Leader:
Statesman to Some, Bully to Others, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1992, at A18; see also Wayne S.
Smith, The End of the Cold War? U.S.-Cuba Relations Remain Unchanged; Diplomacy:
Legislation Before Congress Aims to Punish Cuba and Help Drive Castro from Power. But
It Might Only Be Hurting U.S. Businesses, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1992, at M2.
115. See Carla Anne Robbins, Dateline Washington: Cuban-American Clout, 88 FOR-
EIGN POL'Y 162, 171-72 (1992).
116. For a discussion of Jorge Mas Canosa and his political influence, see Cathy Booth,
The Man Who Would Oust Castro; Jorge Mas Canosa Hasn't Reached His Goal Yet, But
He May Be the World's Most Influential Cuban Exile, TIME, Oct. 26, 1992, at 56; Larry
Rohter, supra note 114, at A18.
117. See Rohter, supra note 114, at A18; see also Smith, supra note 114, at M2.
118. Palmer, supra note 114, at 1933; Robbins, supra note 115, at 173.
119. Robbins, supra note 115, at 173; Booth, supra note 116, at 56.
120. Rohter, supra note 114, at A18.
121. Booth, supra note 116, at 57; see also Robbins, supra note 115, at 162.
122. Robbins, supra note 115, at 165. According to the aides, "[i]ts popularity, they say,
is proof of the potency of the interest-group politics played by Mas Canosa and the Founda-
tion." Id. at 165.
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dation." ' 3 Democrats supported the bill all the while hoping the
President would veto it.' 4 Despite the CANF's strong financial
support, the Bush Administration did, in fact, initially block pas-
sage of the Mack Amendment.12 5 The Mack Amendment was ini-
tially part of the Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990,126
which former President Bush opposed, in part, because of the
strong foreign reaction to the Amendment.
27
Of the international community's members, Canada and the
United Kingdom's reactions to the Mack Amendment were strong-
est.'2 8 Canada took two actions. The "Canadian Attorney General
Kim Campbell issued an order barring Canadian corporations from
complying with U.S. measures precluding subsidiary trade, and re-
quired companies to report any directives relating to such mea-
sures to the Canadian Attorney General."'2 9 The Foreign Affairs
Minister of Canada, Joe Clark, sent a message to James Baker de-
claring that Canada considered the Mack Amendment "'an intru-
sion into Canadian sovereignty.' "1so Britain responded by threat-
ening to invoke the Protection of Trading Interests Act.'3 ' Such a
threat would block the effects of the Mack Amendment because
the Act "forbid[s] compliance by British citizens and businesses
with orders of foreign authorities, where those orders have extra-
territorial effect and prejudice British trading interests.
'' 32
When the Mack Amendment neared approval in Congress, as
part of the Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990, President
Bush issued a Memorandum of Disapproval which stated that:
H.R. 4653 [The Export Administration Act] would be harmful
to closely linked U.S. economic and foreign policy interests. For
123. Robbins, supra note 115, at 165.
124. Id. at 166.
125. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Omnibus Export Amendments Act of
1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1839 (Nov. 16, 1990).
126. See John R. Cranford, Senate Relaxes Security Controls on High-Technology Ex-
ports, 48 CONG. Q. 2902 (1990).
127. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Omnibus Export Amendments Act of
1990, supra note 125.
128. H.R. REP. No. 615, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 20 (1992) (dissenting views of the
Honorable Doug Bereuter).
129. KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 15.
130. Id.
131. 1980, ch. 11 (Eng.). For a thorough discussion of the British Protection of Trading
Interests Act, see A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection
of Trading Interests Act 1980, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
132. Lowe, supra note 131, at 257.
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example under section 128 of the bill there would be extraterri-
torial application of U.S. law that could force foreign subsidiar-
ies of U.S. firms to choose between violating U.S. or host coun-
try laws.
3
The Bush administration also disapproved because it realized that
if, for example, Japan passed an act which banned its subsidiaries
in the United States from trading with Europe, the United States
would also protest violently.
1 34
In addition, the State Department opposed the Mack Amend-
ment. A cable from the U.S. State Department to U.S. embassies
in Brussels, Paris, and Ottawa in 1989 demonstrates this initial
opposition:
We permit these activities [subsidiary trade] ... because we rec-
ognize that attempting to apply our embargo to third countries
will lead to unproductive and bitter trade disputes with our al-
lies. A number of our major trading partners have enacted so-
called blocking statutes that could prohibit any company organ-
ized under local laws from complying with U.S. embargoes ....
The Department of State has opposed the amendment spon-
sored by Senator Mack because of its extraterritorial
implications.'35
Despite the State Department's disapproval, the Mack Amend-
ment became law in 1992, as part of the CDA.'36
B. The Cause of Such a Drastic Change in Policy: Politics
and the 1992 Presidential Election Year
In the 1992 Presidential Election, Bill Clinton targeted Florida
as one of the key states to win his presidential bid. To increase his
chance of winning Florida, Clinton sought the Cuban-American
voters who, in 1988, voted for George Bush by greater than eighty-
five percent. 137 Accordingly, Clinton used the CDA as a means to
133. Memorandum of Disapproval for the Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990,
supra note 125. The host country is the country in which the subsidiary is incorporated.
134. See Guy Gugliotta, The Castro Bill: No Cigar; Congress Gets a Bad Plan to Oust
Fidel and Bring on Democracy, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1992, at C5.
135. KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 15 (quoting "Cuba Sanctions Amend-
ment in the State Authorization Bill," from U.S. State Department to U.S. embassies in
Brussels, Paris, and Ottawa, Sept. 1989).
136. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6005(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
137. Rohter, supra note 107, at A6. Florida, after all, ranks fourth among the nation's
most populated states. Id.
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secure the Cuban-American vote.138
On April 23, 1992, Bill Clinton, speaking in Little Havana,13'
told Cuban exiles that he supported the CDA.14 0 At his fund-rais-
ing dinner,14 1 Mr. Clinton stated, "'I think this Administration has
missed a big opportunity to put the hammer down on Fidel Castro
and Cuba.' ""
Several days later, President Bush switched from his unfavor-
able position on the CDA.143 Yet, even as George Bush signed the
CDA, he continued to express his opposition to the foreign subsidi-
ary prohibition.' 4
The bill's signing was a truly partisan event. While the key
sponsors of the bill were New Jersey Representative Robert Tor-
ricelli and Florida Senator Bob Graham, both Democrats, Presi-
dent Bush flew to Miami to sign the bill at a Republican campaign
rally. 14 5 Mr. Clinton meanwhile retorted, after the bill's signing,
that Bush only signed the CDA because Clinton backed it, and ex-
clusion of the Democratic sponsors from the signing ceremony was
the "'cheapest kind of politics.' -'i In short, the CDA passed with
138. See George E. Jordan, 16 Days Campaign Countdown, NEWSDAY, Oct. 18, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSDY File.
139. Little Havana is an area in Miami which is heavily populated by Cuban-
Americans.
140. Tom Fiedler, Clinton Backs Torricelli Bill: 'I Like It,' He Tells Cuba Exiles,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 24, 1992, at Al.
141. Mr. Clinton's fund-raiser raised $125,000. Rohter, supra note 107, at A6. At least
one other authority has stated that Mr. Clinton only received $75,000 for the dinner. Alex-
ander Cockburn, Embracing the Carcass of Cold War; Candidate Clinton Makes President
Bush Look Like a Dove, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1992, at M5. In fact, Alexander Cockburn com-
mented in his article that "Clinton's surrender to the exile lobby was bought fairly cheaply.
• Id.
President Clinton also received $150,000 from a similar fundraiser in Coral Gables.
Pamela Falk, Exiles Set Policy Agenda on Cuba for New Administration, WALL ST. J., Oct.
16, 1992, at A15; see also Edward Cuddy, Repressive Cuba Policy Is Outmoded, BUFFALO
NEWS, Aug. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUFNEW File (stating that the
Clinton campaign received $275,000 from anti-Castro lobbyists).
142. Rohter, supra note 107, at A6.
143. "Mr. Bush reluctantly endorsed the bill despite reservations about provisions af-
fecting United States allies and American companies whose foreign subsidiaries do business
with Cuba." Rohter, supra note 107, at A6.
144. "'The President did not like that part of the bill but decided it was not sufficient
reason to veto the entire bill, as he had done before .... .' Rick Eyerdam, Running the
Cuban Agenda: Mas & Co. Are on a Roll, S. FLA. Bus. J., Nov. 2, 1992, at Al, A12.
145. Christopher Marquis & Paul Anderson, Bush to Sign Cuba Bill Today in Miami,
MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 23, 1992, at Al.
146. J. Jennings Moss, Clinton Says Bill on Cuba is Signed Because of Him, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1992, at A4.
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the help of election-year politics and the CANF "political
machine."
President Bill Clinton14 7 and his Secretary of State, Warren
Christopher,1 48 have remained committed to following the terms of
the CDA. 149 Yet, the United Nations (U.N.) has overwhelmingly
condemned the United States' extraterritorial application of the
CDA.150
C. What "Politics as Usual" Has Given the People of the
United States
The Cuban Democracy Act"5' has two major provisions which
are designed to strengthen the present embargo against Cuba. Sec-
tion 6005(a), the first provision, revokes OFAC's licensing author-
ity.1 52 By removing this licensing authority, the first provision bans
U.S. foreign subsidiaries from legally trading with Cuba.1 53 Corpo-
rations which violate the CDA face penalties under the Trading
with the Enemy Act. 54 These penalties include criminal liability
not to exceed one million dollars'55 and civil liability no greater
than fifty thousand dollars. 56 In addition to criminal 57 and civil
fines, 15 individuals face a possible ten-year prison term. 59
However, the Act contains an important exception to these
147. See Tom Fiedler, Clinton: Cuba Embargo 'Right; Vows to Keep Pressure Up,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 6, 1993, at Al; UN Setback 'Will Not Change' Washington's Policy on
Cuba, supra note 107.
148. Pat M. Holt, Put Policy Toward Cuba on a More Rational Basis, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 4, 1992, at 18.
149. U.N. Backs Cuba on U.S. Embargo, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1992, at A14.
150. See supra note 12. The U.N. vote on the Act took place on November 24, 1992,
and Mr. Clinton confirmed his support for the Act after this date. See Fiedler, supra note
147.
151. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6001 (West Supp. 1993).
152. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6005(a) (West Supp. 1993).
153. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 34,709 (1993) (to be codified
at 31 C.F.R. § 515) (detailing the rule amendments to the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations).
154. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6009(d) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that penalties set forth under
the Trading with the Enemy Act apply to violations of the CDA).
155. Trading with the Enemy Act, § 106, 40 Stat. 411, 425 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C.A. app. § 16(a) (West Supp. 1993)).
156. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 16(b)(1).
157. Id. § 16(a).
158. Id. § 16(b)(1).
159. Id. § 16(a).
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provisions. It does not apply to existing contracts. 160 This excep-
tion appears to have been created to sidestep the quagmire and
international outcry prompted by the Reagan administration's
1981 ban on the "export and re-export to the U.S.S.R. of equip-
ment manufactured in the United States for use in the Soviet gas
pipeline then under construction. '" 161
Most notably, the Act does not limit itself to the interests of
the United States or to U.S. corporations. It also contains a section
encouraging the President to persuade "the governments of coun-
tries that conduct trade with Cuba to restrict their trade and
credit relations with Cuba .... ,,16 The CDA also states that the
President may deny eligibility "for assistance under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 .. .or assistance or sales under the Arms
Export Control Act ....,,6 Originally, this section required the
President to enter into talks with countries trading with Cuba, and
the sanction automatically applied to those countries who failed to
stop their trade.1"' However, in part because this section would
necessarily terminate aid to Russia, who still trades with Cuba, 165
Congress changed the President's duty to terminate aid into a dis-
cretionary, rather than mandatory, one. 66 Because the major pro-
visions of the Act are designed to affect foreign corporations, the
legal underpinnings of this provision are crucial.
160. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6005(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
161. Geric Lebedoff & Caroline Raievski, A French Perspective on the United States
Ban on the Soviet Gas Pipeline Equipment, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 483 (1983). For a thorough
discussion of the pipeline dispute and the international law implications thereof, see id.;
Jerome J. Zaucha, The Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Export Controls, 15 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1169, 1173-78 (1983); Ann dePender Zeigler,
Comment, The Siberian Pipeline Dispute and the Export Administration Act: What's Left
of Extraterritorial Limits and the Act of State Doctrine?, 6 Hous. J. INT'L L. 63 (1983);
Note, Extraterritorial Subsidiary Jurisdiction, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 73-74 (1987);
see also Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982); Compagnie
Europenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., 22 I.L.M. 66 (1983).
162. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6003(a) (West Supp. 1993).
163. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6003(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1993).
164. See CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT OF 1992: HEARINGS AND MARKUP ON H.R. 4168 AND H.R.
5323 BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 102d Cong.,
2d. Sess. 380-81 (1992) (testimony of Robert S. Gelbard, Principal Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Inter-American Affairs).
165. Id.
166. See Robert S. Gelbard, Congressional Testimony on the Cuban Democracy Act,
Address Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee for Western Hemi-
sphere and Peace Corps Affairs 5 (Aug. 5, 1992) (transcript available from the State
Department).
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IV. THE CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT'S EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION: THE U.S. VIEW
A. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Generally
The CDA is more than one isolated attempt by the United
States to achieve its policy objectives through export controls.
Over the last twenty years, the United States has increasingly used
export controls to expand its influence around the world.'67 Nota-
bly, many of these U.S. attempts to influence world politics
through export controls, such as prohibiting the exportation of
arms and ammunition to certain countries, comport with interna-
tional law. 168
However, U.S. regulation of its foreign subsidiaries has been
less credible internationally.' While the United States maintains
that its extraterritorial regulation of foreign subsidiaries, like the
CDA, complies with international law, 70 its closest allies vehe-
mently assert the contrary.
17
167. See Richard S. Elliott, Comment, Export Administration Act of 1979: Latest
Statutory Resolution of the "Right to Export" Versus National Security and Foreign Pol-
icy Controls, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255 (1981).
168. See John F. Murphy & Arthur T. Downey, National Security, Foreign Policy and
Individual Rights: The Quandary of United States Export Controls, 30 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q.
791, 793 (1981) (stating that export controls comport with international law if they control
items that threaten national security).
169. See supra note 161 (articles discussing problems the U.S. had with its Soviet pipe-
line regulations); Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Havers, Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: A Dis-
cussion of Problems Concerning the Exercise of Jurisdiction, 17 INT'L LAW. 784 (1983).
170. See John R. Stevenson, Extraterritoriality in Canadian United States Relations,
Address Before the Canadian Bar Association (Oct. 12, 1970), in UNITED STATES ECONOMIC
MEASURES AGAINST CUBA, supra note 12, at 230, 232. In a speech to the Canadian Bar Asso-
ciation regarding the application of U.S. laws to subsidiaries of U.S. corporations in Canada,
John R. Stevenson, the Legal Adviser to the State Department, stated that "[i]t is impor-
tant to recognize here, as in the antitrust field, that these conflicts are due to two separate
but valid exercises of jurisdiction .... UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA,
supra note 12, at 230, 232; see also, DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL & WILLIAM M. KNIGHTON, NA-
TIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 58
(1982).
171. See The European Community's 1982 Diplomatic Note and Legal Comments on
the Extraterritorial Issues Presented By United States Economic Measures Against the
U.S.S.R., presented to the United States Department of State (Aug. 12, 1982), reprinted in
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA; PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED NATIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES, supra note 12, at 200, 203-07; see also, ROSENTHAL &
KNIGHTON, supra note 170, at 58.
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1. Prescriptive Jurisdiction
The legality of U.S. regulation of its foreign subsidiaries under
international law requires that the United States be able to exer-
cise prescriptive jurisdiction 7 ' over those subsidiaries. Yet, tradi-
tional international law affords a state prescriptive jurisdiction to
pass laws regulating conduct only within its own territory.'7 3
2. Nationality Principle
As international communications advanced, however enter-
prises expanded internationally, and commercial relations became
more sophisticated. The result of this expansion was a trend to-
wards expanding the bases of jurisdiction. 74 One of these ex-
panded bases of jurisdiction was the nationality principle.
175
The United States asserts that its regulation of foreign U.S.
subsidiaries falls squarely within the nationality principle.
17
1
Under the current interpretation of this principle, the United
States can control all of its nationals.' 77 The generally accepted
rule of the United States is that the state of incorporation deter-
mines a corporation's nationality.'7 8 Yet, when the need for a more
expansive view of jurisdiction arises, the United States asserts that
the place of a corporation's control, rather than the state of incor-
poration, determines its nationality."19 Thus, the United States
claims that it has prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries
because their parent corporations in the United States control
them.18
0
172. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States defines pre-
scriptive jurisdiction as:
jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e., to make its law applicable to the activities, rela-
tions, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legis-
lation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by de-
termination of a court ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a) (1986)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
173. See 1 CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 199 (2d. ed. 1945); L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 144(a) (8th ed. 1955).
174. See J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 201 (10th ed. 1989).
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 402 cmt. e.
176. Craig, supra note 39, at 588.
177. Id. at 589.
178. Id. at 588.
179. Id. at 589.
180. Id. See Stanley J. Marcuss & Eric L. Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in
United States Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
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The Second Restatement of Foreign Relations of the United
States supports this view that:
[w]hen the nationality of a corporation is different from the na-
tionality of the persons ... who own or control it, the state of
the nationality of such persons has jurisdiction to prescribe, and
to enforce in its territory, rules of law governing their conduct.
It is thus in a position to control the conduct of the corporation
even though it does not have jurisdiction to prescribe rules di-
rectly applicable to the corporation. 8'
Yet, the U.S. government's and the Second Restatement's posi-
tions on prescriptive jurisdiction squarely contradict that of the in-
ternational community."8 2
B. The International Community's Position on Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction
Other nations insist that the true test of a corporation's na-
tionality is not control; rather, it is the place of incorporation. 183
The International Court of Justice supported this view in Barce-
lona Traction, holding that "[tihe traditional rule attributes the
right of diplomatic protection of a corporate entity to the State
under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose territory it
has its registered office."'' " Thus, an international law dispute has
439, 444-45 (1981); Extraterritorial Application of United States Law: The Case of Export
Controls, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 355, 374 (1984); cf. Thompson, supra note 36, 367-72.
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 27
cmt. (d) (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
182. See British Aide-Memoire to the Commission of the European Communities
(1969), reprinted in IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (4th ed.
1990); The European Community's 1982 Diplomatic Note and Legal Comments on the Ex-
traterritorial Issues Presented by United States Economic Measures against the U.S.S.R.,
Presented to the United States Department of State on (Aug. 12, 1982), reprinted in
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA, supra note 12, at 200, 204; Havers,
supra note 169, at 792.
183. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 181, § 27, cmt. (c); British Aide-
Memoire to the Commission of the European Communities (1969), reprinted in IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (4th ed. 1990); The European
Community's 1982 Diplomatic Note and Legal Comments on the Extraterritorial Issues
Presented by United States Economic Measures against the U.S.S.R., Presented to the
United States Department of State on (Aug. 12, 1982), reprinted in UNITED STATES Eco-
NOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA, supra note 12, at 200, 204; Havers, supra note 169, at 792.
184. Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Judgment of Feb. 5). The
court also noted that the incorporation test had been "confirmed by long practice and by
numerous international instruments." Id. at 43; see also Havers, supra note 169, at 792
(stating that his country, the United Kingdom, believed that the incorporation test was sup-
ported by the International Court of Justice). But see Marcuss & Richard, supra note 180,
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developed between the United States and foreign nations regard-
ing extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries.
C. The Second Restatement's Position on Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The Comity Requirement
Rather than promulgate rules for determining which nation
has prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries, the Second
Restatement has developed a comity requirement to determine
prescriptive jurisdiction.1 15 Under the principle of comity, interna-
tional law recognizes that more than one state may have a jurisdic-
tional claim to regulate a particular activity.186 Where two states
prescribe rules that "require inconsistent conduct" upon a person:
each state is required ... to consider, in good faith, moderating
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction in light of such fac-
tors as:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take
place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement action of either state
can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the
rule prescribed by that state. 187
However, the Second Restatement's comity requirement ap-
plies to limited circumstances only.188 It applies only when the re-
quirements of a foreign nation conflict with those of the forum
state. It does not apply when the foreign jurisdiction merely per-
mits commerce between itself and a third country, because in that
situation the laws of the two nations are not in conflict.189
at 457 (stating that even though the court in Barcelona Traction accorded the incorporation
test great weight, "the court's acknowledgement that no test had found general acceptance
leaves room for argument on the question of precisely how dispositive the place of incorpo-
ration [test] should be in any specific situation").
185. Stanley J. Marcuss & Dale P. Butland, Reconciling National Interests in the Reg-
ulation of International Business, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 349, 352 (1979); Davis R. Robin-
son, Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Draft Restatement, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1147,
1150 (1983).
186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 181, § 40.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 181, § 40.




For example, if Spain merely permits trade with Cuba, then
the Restatement's comity section would not apply because there
would be no conflict of requirements between United States and
Spanish law. Comity would apply only if Spain enacted a blocking
order which forbade Spanish companies from discontinuing trade
with Cuba because of U.S. law. Therefore, the Second Restatement
favors states engaging in expansive regulation and "disregard[s]
the interests of those states which favor freedom from regulation
and the territorial concept of jurisdiction. '" 190
Although the United States realizes that foreign nations disa-
gree with the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, it continues
to exercise this broad grant of authority under the Second Re-
statement. 91 As Andreas F. Lowenfeld, the Deputy Legal Adviser
to the State Department, stated:
[T]he United States has been the most ambitious of the major
democratic states in trying to regulate international commerce;
it has at least a claim to jurisdiction over vast commercial enter-
prises abroad owned and controlled by American parent compa-
nies; and it has tried with fair success to impose various pro-
grams of economic denial ....
... With regard to protests from other countries (or from
private persons sought to be subjected to regulation), I think
one can fairly say that there is little substance to the charge of
violation of international law. As to conflicts with the domestic
law of other countries, both courts and federal agencies in the
United States have been careful not to put persons, particularly
aliens, in the position of having to violate one law or the
other. 192
However, the United States' expansive view of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, irrespective of its doctrinal underpinnings, is politi-
cally inflammatory because it triggers deeply-embedded national
interests of foreign nations. As one commentator stated, "[a] state
may have certain deeply rooted policies or customs, infringement
of which can touch a sensitive nerve of the sovereign and cause
190. Id.
191. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Book Review, 28 HARV. L. REV. 1699, 1705 (1965) (re-
viewing, LAWRENCE F. EBB, INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss: REGULATION AND PROTECTION (1964));
see also Craig, supra note 39, at 592-93.
192. Lowenfeld, supra note 191, at 1705; see also Craig, supra note 39, at 592-93.
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perhaps a more severe reaction than infringement of its law." 193 As
the Attorney General for the United Kingdom said in a speech re-
garding the Siberian pipeline episode:
194
Extraterritoriality, or "ET" as it is known for short requires
control. We say most firmly "ET-Go home!". . . We cannot af-
ford a repetition of the pipeline fiasco, a fiasco that damaged the
Western alliance far more than it hurt the Russians. We cannot
allow our trading partnerships to be placed under the strains
and uncertainties which the Export Administration Act
engenders.195
The Second Restatement's approach was problematic because
it suggested political, rather than legal, solutions to the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Under the Second Restatement's posi-
tion, foreign countries could prevent, with certainty, the United
States from asserting such extraterritorial jurisdiction only by em-
ploying political treaties, agreements, 196 or international pres-
sure.19 7 Foreign nations could not rely on the courts.198 The courts
could only moderate those countries that attempted to enforce
their extraterritorial jurisdiction; courts could not moderate those
countries that merely asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction.199 This
distinction has been critical because the international community
has objected to both forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction-its as-
sertion and its enforcement.
Had the United States captured the spirit of the Second Re-
statement-that extraterritorial jurisdiction should be imposed
193. John M. Raymond, The Exercise of Concurrent International Jurisdiction: "Move
With Circumspection Appropriate," 8 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 673-77 (1967).
194. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing the Siberian pipeline
episode).
195. Havers, supra note 169, at 792.
196. See A.H. HERMANN, CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL LAWS WITH INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
ACTIVITY: ISSUES OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 4-5, 67-68 (1982) (suggesting that seeking limited
international agreements would block the extraterritorial application of other countries'
laws); Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 Am. J.
COMP. L. 579, 587 (1983) (discussing an agreement of antitrust cooperation between the U.S.
and Australia and the corresponding benefits).
197. See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text (discussing examples of foreign
countries exerting pressure on the U.S.).
198. Under the Second Restatement, courts are only able to limit the U.S. exercise of
expansive jurisdiction if the regulations that the United States prescribes requires a person
to perform conduct which would be in conflict to conduct required by the host state. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 181, § 40. Even then, the United States is only required to
consider moderating its conduct when certain factors are present. Id.
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 181, § 40.
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only in limited circumstances after weighing the foreign govern-
ment's interest in the regulations- 200 the Second Restatement's
position might have worked. However, the United States ignored
both the spirit of the Restatement and other states' interests 201 to
enlarge its extraterritorial jurisdiction.202 In short, the Second Re-
statement failed to influence the extraterritorial application of
U.S. laws, while it concurrently recognized that two states may
have an interest in regulating trade. A new approach was long
overdue.
V. THE LEGALITY OF THE FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY PROHIBITION
UNDER THE THIRD RESTATEMENT
The Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations of the
United States20 3 has enunciated a new approach. Under the Third
Restatement, jurisdictional conflicts are legal, rather than primar-
ily political. 204 A court no longer decides which state should moder-
ate its practice of jurisdiction. 20 5 Rather, the court weighs the fac-
tors applicable to the conflict to determine, as a matter of law,
whether the state may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction. 20 6 Appli-
cation of this approach to the U.S. regulation of U.S. owned for-
200. Id.
201. One commentator has noted that the foreign states interests are so strong that:
[t]he United States government should not attempt to regulate the export activi-
ties of foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations unless the subsidiaries
are simply a conduit through which a United States origin commodity passes on
its way to its intended destination in a third state in order to circumvent con-
trols over export from the United States or when the subsidiaries are manufac-
turing high technology strategic products based on United States technology be-
cause in that case the security of the United States is involved.
J.G. CASTEL, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: CANADA AND UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA PRACTICES COMPARED 166 (1988).
202. For law review articles and court decisions that discuss the problems that emerged
as a result of the Reagan Administration's pipeline restrictions, see supra note 161.
203. Although the Third Restatement is not binding authority, it is influential in U.S.
courts. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976)
(using the Second Restatement when determining what elements to be weighed when deter-
mining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be exercised); ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON,
supra note 170, at 57. Furthermore, in 1979 the Department of State sent a letter to Senator
Kennedy stating that the jurisdictional analysis used by the Department of State generally
follows the approach of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States. Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 158, 180 n.2 (1980).
204. Robinson, supra note 185, at 1152.
205. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 181, § 40.
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 403 reporters' note 10.
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eign subsidiaries trading with Cuba reveals the illegality of such
regulation.
A. Territorial Principle
The Third Restatement recognizes several bases for jurisdic-
tion of which the territorial and nationality principles are relevant
here.2 0 7 The territorial principle is the most common basis for the
exercise of jurisdiction. 2 8 The territorial principle includes two
concepts, subjective territoriality and objective territoriality. 20 9
The re-imposition of the ban on foreign subsidiary trade to Cuba is
rooted in neither of these concepts.
Under the subjective territoriality principle, a state has juris-
diction over any corporation performing the requisite act or omis-
sion within the state asserting such jurisdiction.10 Yet, the United
States is attempting to regulate foreign subsidiaries which do busi-
ness beyond its territorial limits. Thus, the subjective territoriality
principle provides no basis for this ban.'
Under the objective territoriality principle, a state may assert
jurisdiction over a corporation, even if the regulated activity takes
place outside that state, as long as the activity in question has a
"substantial effect" 212 within the regulating state..2 " For example,
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 402 cmts. c-g. With respect to the prohi-
bition in the present regulation, only the territorial and nationality principles are relevant.
See infra notes 207-28 and accompanying text. The protective principle is not applicable
because none of the exports to Cuba threaten the security of the United States. See
KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 12 (discussing what goods are shipped to Cuba
by U.S. foreign subsidiaries); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 402 cmt. f. The pas-
sive personality principle is not relevant since it is generally limited to crimes. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 172, § 402 cmt. g.
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 402 cmt. c.
209. MESTRAL & GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 47, at 19.
210. MESTRAL & GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 47, at 19; see also, Schooner Ex-
change v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) where Chief Justice Marshall stated the
classic territorial view as "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory is necessa-
rily exclusive and absolute: It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any
restriction upon it... from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty.
... Id. at 135.
211. See Thompson, supra note 36, at 363.
212. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 402(1)(c) does state that jurisdiction
would be permissible if the regulated conduct was intended to have a substantial effect
within the United States, however this is not determinative as foreign subsidiary trade with
Cuba is not intended to have an effect on the United States. This is evidenced by the fact
that almost three quarters of all Cuban imports from U.S. subsidiaries is in foodstuffs,
which have no effect within the United States. See KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68,
at 11; Marcuss & Richard, supra note 180, at 469. Furthermore, most of the remaining trade
1993]
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two commentators have suggested that, under this "effects doc-
trine" of objective territoriality, a foreign subsidiary's refusal to
comply with the U.S. embargo of Cuba would constitute an "ef-
fect" for purposes of establishing jurisdiction because this non-
compliance makes the embargo less effective.""4
Yet, this reasoning is problematic under the objective territo-
riality principle because U.S. subsidiary trade with Cuba does not
have a substantial effect within the United States, as the principle
requires. United States subsidiary trade with Cuba only effects a
decrease in the impact of a U.S. ban that controls trade outside
the United States. 21 '5 "[I]t can hardly be argued that the objective
territorial principle covers such an effect, because the effect is not
within the territory of the state. 2 16 Thus, the objective territorial-
ity principle is as inapposite a legal basis for the Cuban trade em-
bargo as the subjective territoriality principle.
The "effects doctrine" might be used to prohibit the export of
certain items to Cuba where those items would have an effect
within the United States. Under this reasoning, the United States
involves normal commercial commodities the use of which in Cuba would have no effect
within the U.S. See KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 12, 13.
213. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 402 cmt. d; see also United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d. Cir. 1945), where Judge Learned Hand
first articulated the "effects test" when he stated that "any state may impose liabilities,
even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within its borders which the state reprehends."
However, as any action in one state may have some remote or speculative effect in
another, Learned Hand's articulation of the effects test has been limited so that only real
and substantial effects are sufficient for establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction. MESTRAL &
GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 47, at 20; Kathleen Hixson, Note, Extraterritorial Juris-
diction Under the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 12
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 127, 138 (1988); Marcuss & Richard, supra note 180, at 443.
Despite these limitations, the "effects doctrine" has been widely criticized, especially in
its application to antitrust laws. See, Warren Pengilley, Extraterritorial Effects of United
States Commercial and Antitrust Legislation: A View From "Down Under", 16 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 833, 847 & 871-79 (1983); P.C. Pettit & C.J. Styles, The International Re-
sponse to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW.
697, 697-98 (1982); Debate, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law (Economic
Imperialism or Protecting Competition Against Foreign Invasion?), 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 617
(1981).
214. Thompson, supra note 36, at 363-64; Zipper, supra note 11, at 1054, (noting that
one could argue plausibly that subsidiary non-compliance would constitute a sufficient effect
for purposes of the objective territorial principle).
215. As one commentator stated, this argument would only be tenable "where the effect
was to make ineffective the state's laws with respect to things within its territory." MESTRAL
& GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 47, at 34.
216. MESTRAL & GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 47, at 34.
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could ban factory equipment exports to Cuba that would emit pol-
lutants affecting air quality over Southern Florida. 1 ' On the other
hand, the United States could not, under this doctrine, ban the
food or harvesting equipment exports to Cuba; these would have
no effect within the United States.
1 8
However, the CDA is an across-the-board prohibition of ex-
ports from U.S. foreign subsidiaries, irrespective of the product's
potential effect or non-effect within the United States. Therefore,
the "effects doctrine" is, in fact, inapplicable to this analysis and
provides no legal justification for this new U.S. prohibition.
219
Even if the CDA were not an across-the-board prohibition, the
"effects doctrine" would remain inapplicable to proscribe most
U.S. subsidiary trade. First, almost three quarters of all Cuban im-
ports from U.S. subsidiaries are foodstuffs120 having no effect
within the United States.22' Second, ninety-three percent of all
subsidiary exports to Cuba consist of consumables-the Cuban use
of which, again, has no effect within the United States.2 In short,
the territorial principle provides no legal justification for the CDA
because the CDA has no impact within U.S. borders.
B. Nationality Principle
A state may also assert jurisdiction under the nationality prin-
ciple to prescribe laws governing the conduct of its nationals,
whether occurring inside or outside its territory.22' The Third Re-
statement defines the nationality of a corporation by its state of
incorporation.2 2 " A fortiori, the nationality principle precludes U.S.
assertion of jurisdiction over U.S. foreign subsidiaries precisely be-
cause those subsidiaries are incorporated in foreign states, rather
than the United States.2 5
217. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 180, at 469.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 11.
221. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 180, at 469.
222. See KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 13.
223. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 402 cmt. e.
224. Id. The Third Restatement § 402(2) does not directly address the U.S. jurisdic-
tion over foreign subsidiaries. The Third Restatement § 402 cmt. e provides that the
"[e]xercise by a state of jurisdiction over foreign corporations owned or controlled by its
nationals, by extension of or by analogy to the nationality principle, is addressed in § 414."
See infra, notes 229-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 414.
225. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 414 cmt. a.
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Under the nationality principle, the United States can pro-
hibit U.S. nationals from participating in the U.S. foreign subsidi-
ary trade with Cuba. 2 6 In other words, the nationality principle
only applies to the extent that the person is a U.S. national. Yet,
because the CDA prohibits U.S. nationals' and non-nationals' par-
ticipation in trade with Cuba, the nationality principle only par-
tially supports the CDA prohibition as to nationals.22 Second, the
Third Restatement's construction of the nationality principle ex-
pressly precludes the United States from regulating the activities
of any foreign subsidiary solely because that subsidiary is owned or
controlled by U.S. nationals.2 8 In short, U.S. prohibitions of for-
eign subsidiary trade necessarily fail under the nationality
principle.
C. Third Restatement § 414 Jurisdiction with Respect to
Activities of Foreign Subsidiaries
2 '9
1. A Standard of Reasonableness
The Third Restatement provides a specific basis for foreign
subsidiary jurisdiction. Section 414(2)230 provides "that subject to
section 403 and section 441, it may not be unreasonable for a state
to exercise jurisdiction for limited purposes with respect to activi-
226. Id.
227. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6005 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that licenses will no longer be
granted for U.S. foreign subsidiary trade to Cuba irrespective of whether no U.S. nationals
are involved in the trade). In addition, the pre-CDA regulations had the practical effect of
prohibiting U.S. nationals from participating in U.S. foreign subsidiary trade because the
present regulations bar any employee or officer of the U.S. parent firm from participating in
the trade. 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(c) (1992).
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 414(2) cmt. f.
229. The Third Restatement § 414(1) also applies to jurisdiction over foreign branches.
However, this section is not applicable here because a foreign branch differs from a foreign
subsidiary. A foreign branch is not a distinct legal entity as it is not incorporated in the host
state. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 414 cmt. a.
230. At least one commentator has suggested that § 414 of the Third Restatement is
not a proper basis for analyzing U.S. jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries as "the priorities
suggested in that section are not shared by the United States." Thompson, supra note 36, at
382-83. This reasoning is unsound for two reasons. First, it is irrelevant that these priorities
are not shared by the United States. The Restatement is not simply an enunciation of the
U.S. views; it is intended to be an accurate reflection of the international community's
views. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, at 3. Furthermore, that the United States
does not share these priorities is obvious, because this section is intended to improve on the
Second Restatement by limiting the U.S. expansive view of jurisdiction over foreign subsid-
iaries. See supra text accompanying notes 200-06.
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ties of affiliated foreign entities.""2 ' Section 414 expresses what is
implicit in foreign subsidiary jurisdiction-the state of the parent
corporation and the host state of the subsidiary may both have
legitimate interests in regulation. As the Third Restatement notes:
[tihat a subsidiary is incorporated in another state and is sub-
ject to its laws limits the jurisdiction to prescribe of the state of
the parent. On the other hand, a host state cannot, by requiring
a foreign-owned enterprise to incorporate under its laws, deprive
the state of the parent corporation of all authority over the en-
terprise. The enterprise itself cannot, by incorporating in a for-
eign state, escape all regulatory authority of the state of the par-
ent corporation.32
The Third Restatement recognizes that extraterritorial sub-
sidiary regulation has generated "substantial controversy" among
states.233 Thus, such regulation is exceptional and should be exer-
cised in limited circumstances.3 4
2. The Meaning of "Exceptional Cases"
With respect to export controls, the Third Restatement pro-
vides that extraterritorial jurisdiction may not be unreasonable in
exceptional cases.23 5 This depends upon all relevant factors, in-
cluding the extent to which:
(i) the regulation is essential to the implementation of a pro-
gram to further a major national interest of the state exercising
jurisdiction;
(ii) the national program of which the regulation is a part can be
carried out effectively only if it is applied also to foreign
subsidiaries;
(iii) the regulation conflicts or is likely to
conflict with the law or policy of the state
where the subsidiary is established. '
Furthermore, the Third Restatement provides that "the burden of
establishing reasonableness is heavier when the direction is issued
231. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 414 (2). For the purposes of this
analysis, it will be assumed that the requirements of sections 403 and 436 have been
satisfied.
232. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 414 cmt. b.
233. Id. § 414 cmt. a.
234. Id.




to the foreign subsidiary than when it is issued to the parent cor-
poration. '23 7 Thus, the CDA's direct application to foreign subsidi-
aries would require a heavier burden of reasonableness under the
Third Restatement section 414. The prohibition against foreign
subsidiaries trading with Cuba in the CDA cannot meet this heav-
ier burden of reasonableness.
The Third Restatement is unclear as to whether the term "ex-
ceptional cases" is a separate factor to be analyzed or is simply an
indication that regulation of foreign subsidiaries is normally unac-
ceptable. Two commentators have analyzed the term exceptional
as a separate factor under section 414(2)(b), while another has
not.238 The two commentators who have addressed this term have
suggested that, short of U.S. involvement in war or an imminent
threat, no situation will qualify as exceptional.23 9 For this analysis,
it will be assumed that under the Third Restatement the term,
exceptional case, is a separate factor to be analyzed.
According to the CDA, an exceptional opportunity now exists
to bring about "a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.
24 0
Section 6001(6) of the CDA states that:
[t]he fall of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, the now universal recognition in Latin America and the
Caribbean that Cuba provides a failed model of government and
development, and the evident inability of Cuba's economy to
survive current trends, provide the United States and the inter-
national democratic community with an unprecedented opportu-
nity to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.24
Although bringing democracy to Cuba does not rise to the
level of U.S. involvement in war, it does seem to rise to the level of
exceptional. First, the situation is exceptional in that the opportu-
nity for change in Cuba has developed only with the collapse of the
237. Id. § 414(2)(c).
238. Compare Extraterritorial Subsidiary Jurisdiction, supra note 161, at 81-82 (ana-
lyzing the term exceptional as it applied to the Soviet pipeline incident); Allen DeLoach
Stewart, Comment, New World Ordered: The Asserted Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 53 LA. L. REV. 1389, 1397-98 (1993); (analyzing the term
exceptional as it applied under to the CDA) with Zipper, supra note 11, at 1064 (simply
mentioning that in exceptional cases it may not be unreasonable to exercise direct regula-
tion of a foreign subsidiary).
239. See Extraterritorial Subsidiary Jurisdiction, supra note 161, at 82; Stewart, supra
note 238, at 1397-98.
240. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6001(6) (West Supp. 1993).
241. Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 6001(6) (West Supp. 1993).
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Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This collapse has helped to cre-
ate an "unprecedented opportunity" to bring about a peaceful
transition to democracy in Cuba, a country under communist con-
trol for more than thirty years, and must be considered an excep-
tional case.2 4' Even if this case were exceptional, it would merely
be a factor in extraterritorial jurisdiction. All of the remaining rele-
vant factors in section 414 must also be analyzed to ensure that the
CDA foreign subsidiary regulation is not unreasonable.
In short, despite the Third Restatement's failure to define the
term "exceptional," all the Third Restatement's relevant factors
still prohibit the U.S. extension of its Cuban trade embargo to for-
eign U.S. subsidiaries.2 4
3. The Meaning of "Major National Interest" Within the Re-
statement § 414
a. Third Restatement § 414(2)(b)(i)
First the United States may claim, as it has before, that the
new prohibitions satisfy section 414(2)(b)(i) because they "further
a major national interest."'24" As Assistant Secretary of State for
Congressional Relations, J. Brian Atwood, stated to Senator Ed-
ward Kennedy in a letter concerning the proposed Energy An-
timonopoly Act of 1979:241
[T]he United States has taken the position that foreign subsidi-
aries can be subjected to extraterritorial control in accordance
with international law, and we have justified our actions in these
instances as needed to prevent adverse effects on U.S. commerce
or evasion of an important U.S. policy.2 6
The Third Restatement provides no guidance for determining
whether such a program is of major national interest. 7 Yet, like
the "effects doctrine," what constitutes a major national interest
must bear limits. Otherwise, section 414 would become meaning-
242. Cf. Stewart, supra note 238, at 1398 (stating that arguably democratizing Cuba is
not an exceptional case).
243. See Extraterritorial Subsidiary Jurisdiction, supra note 161, at 82 (suggesting
that, short of U.S. involvement in a war or an imminent threat, nothing may be considered
exceptional under § 414 of the Third Restatement); Stewart, supra note 238, at 1397.
244. See Nash, supra note 203, at 182.
245. S. 1246, 96th Cbng., 1st Sess. (1979).
246. Nash, supra note 203, at 182.
247. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 414(2)(b)(11).
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less.2 48 Every state asserting jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary
would otherwise claim that it was doing so pursuant to a major
national interest.2 49 Most important, the Restatement cautions
that this type of regulation be implemented in limited circum-
stances only.
250
A "major national interest" must be a major national interest
of the country asserting the exception. Here, the United States
must be asserting an interest of its citizens, not those of Cuba. Yet,
the United States' asserted interest is one of democracy in Cuba.251
To construe "major national interest" to encompass national inter-
ests of any country, rather than the country attempting to imple-
ment the regulations, expands the term too far and sets a danger-
ous precedent for international law.252 In short, these prohibitions
are designed to further the Cuban people's interest, rather than
that of the United States; and, therefore, fail to meet the Third
Restatement's requirements for extraterritorial subsidiary
regulation.
The CDA states that the fall of communism in the former So-
viet Union and Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Carib-
bean's recognition that Cuba represents a failed model of govern-
ment, and the Cuban economy's downturn "provide the United
States and the international democratic community with an un-
precedented opportunity to promote a peaceful transition to de-
mocracy in Cuba. ' 253 Democratizing Cuba is a major national in-
terest of Cuba; but it is not a major national interest of the United
States.254
248. Cf. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 180, at 443 (stating that unless real limits were
placed upon the interpretation of the "effects doctrine" the widespread application of the
rule would make "a shambles" of the "effects doctrine").
249. Cf. id.
250. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 414(2).
251. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6001(c) (West Supp. 1993).
252. See Extraterritorial Subsidiary Jurisdiction, supra note 161, at 82 (arguing that
the U.S. foreign policy objective of helping Poland was a national interest of Poland and not
the U.S. and therefore the national interest section was not satisfied).
253. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6001(6) (West Supp. 1993).
254. Contra Zipper, supra note 11, at 1064 (stating that the elimination of Communism
from Cuba has been a major national interest). Zipper's argument is facially incorrect. In
1962 when President Kennedy issued Presidential Proclamation No. 3447 he stated that the
embargo was being implemented because: (1) the Cuban government was at odds with the
"principles and objectives of the Inter-American system" and (2) that Cuba's alignment
with the Soviet powers was a security risk for the United States as well as the hemisphere. 3
C.F.R. 157 (1959-63 comp.), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2370 app. at 551 (1988). Furthermore,
although the U.S. list of preconditions to re-engagement with Cuba expanded over the years
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Further, Cuba no longer threatens U.S. national security. With
the end of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union
have grown to accommodate each other, and that accommodation
has also neutralized Cuba's importance.255 Cuba has renounced
publicly it's former support of revolutionary movements abroad. 56
Wayne S. Smith, former chief of the U.S. Interest Section in Cuba
from 1979 until 1982, has described Cuba as "a minor domestic
problem. 2 5 7 In short, the CDA does not embody a "major national
interest" of the United States, as required by section 414(2)(b)(i).
b. Third Restatement § 414(2)(b)(ii)
Section 414(2)(b)(ii) requires that the regulations' application
to foreign subsidiaries be an essential element of the national pro-
gram.25 Support for the current U.S. policy is rooted in blaming
the Cuban embargo's ineffectiveness on U.S. subsidiary trade with
Cuba. One commentator has insisted, for example, that this is
evinced by the rapid increase in recent years of U.S subsidiary
trade with Cuba.
59
However, such reasoning is grossly simplistic. Generally,
Cuba's trade with U.S. foreign subsidiaries is a very small percent-
age of their total imports.' 0 Furthermore, of the $705 million that
U.S. subsidiaries traded with Cuba in 1990, $500 million was food
to include improvement of human rights and renouncing the support of subversion in Latin
America and Africa, this list did not include renouncing Communism. Wayne S. Smith, A
Pragmatic Cuba Policy, FOREIGN SERVICE J., Apr. 1991, at 22.
255. Smith, supra note 254, at 24.
256. INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE TASK FORCE ON CUBA, CUBA IN THE AMERICAS: RECIPRO-
CAL CHALLENGES 3-4 (1992) (available from the Aspen Institute in Washington D.C.).
257. Marjorie Miller, U.S. Easing Its Stance on Cuba; But Embargo Not Likely to End
Soon, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 11, 1993, at A10, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
HCHRN File.
258. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172.
259. Zipper, supra note 11, at 1064.
260. In 1992 Cuba's total imports represented $4 billion. See Kaplowitz & Kaplowitz,
supra note 68, at 3. Comparing this 1992 value with 1991 estimates of Cuban imports from
U.S. subsidiaries ($383 million), U.S. subsidiary trade during 1991 and 1992 generally com-
prised less than 10% of Cuba's total imports. Compare KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note
68, at 3 (quoting Ra(l Taladrid, Vice President of the Cuban Agency for Economic Coopera-
tion) with SPECIAL TREASURY REPORT ON FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY TRADE WITH CUBA, supra note
90, at 2. While these estimates are based on different years, there has been a general decline
in Cuban imports from 1988 until 1992. Cuba's imports have fallen from $7.5 billion in 1988
to $4 billion in 1992. KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 3. Thus, the real number is
probably less than 10%.
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exported to Cuba.26 This statistic demonstrates that hunger and
human welfare drive Cuban trade with U.S. foreign subsidiaries.
As Continental Grain so accurately stated in a letter to members of
Congress urging them to oppose the Mack Amendment, "it will not
deter Cuba's imports of food commodities and it is not in the best
interest of United States trade.
26 2
Because Cuban people are already suffering from lack of
food-their principal objective of trade-the CDA will not impact
Cuban trade in foodstuffs; Cuba will simply purchase elsewhere
from non-U.S. subsidiaries.23  The same argument applies to
Cuba's exports to U.S. subsidiaries. In 1990, almost all of Cuba's
exports to U.S. subsidiaries consisted of sugar and molasses. If
U.S. subsidiaries are prevented from engaging in this trade, an-
other firm will simply buy these products. Thus, enforcing a U.S.
foreign subsidiary prohibition does nothing to strengthen a U.S.
embargo against Cuba. It merely prevents U.S. foreign subsidiaries
from trading with Cuba, and ensures Cuban trade with other inter-
national sources which recognize the insanity of this extraterrito-
rial policy.26 4 In short, section 414(2)(b)(ii) also fails because the
U.S. foreign subsidiary prohibition is not an essential element of
this national program.
c. Third Restatement § 414(2)(b)(iii)
Under the Third Restatement's § 414(2)(b)(iii), the U.S. pro-
hibition must not conflict or be likely to conflict with the law or
the policy of the state where the subsidiary is incorporated.26 5 The
new U.S. prohibition will conflict directly with the laws of at least
three other nations.266
For instance, the Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial Measures
Order of 1992267 prohibits corporations from complying with such
measures, and requires corporations to notify the Attorney General
261. KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 13.
262. Id. at 15 (quoting Letter from Rebecca Fraily, Continental Grain Company, to
U.S. congressmen (Oct. 12, 1989)).
263. Smith, supra note 114.
264. Since most of what Cuba imports is food and medicine, Cuba will simply buy these
necessities from non-U.S. subsidiaries. See infra notes 317-18; see also CUBA'S TIES TO A
CHANGING WORLD, supra note 98, at 233; KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 11.
265. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 414(2)(b)(iii).
266. See infra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
267. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 1992, 124 C. Gaz. SOR/
90-751 (Can.).
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of Canada whenever there is a directive, instruction, or even an
intimation relating to an extraterritorial measure with respect to
trade or commerce between Canada and Cuba.26 If a Canadian
corporation violates provisions of this Order, the penalties are stiff.
The corporation or its officers are subject to imprisonment, not to
exceed five years, and a fine as large as ten thousand dollars.26 e
On October 20, 1992, Britain invoked the Protection of Trad-
ing Interests Act27 0 which, like the Canadian Foreign Extraterrito-
rial Measures Order, also blocks the implementation of the U.S.
prohibition.27 1 In addition, Mexican-based firms which comply
with the restrictions of the CDA, face severe sanctions from the
Mexican government.1
7 2
In short, the Third Restatement correctly states that an ex-
tension of jurisdiction by a foreign state in this situation should be
prohibited. United States prohibition will truly put U.S. foreign
subsidiaries and their U.S. parent corporations in an impossible
position.274 In the simplest case, foreign subsidiaries can either
268. These provisions state in full:
Notice
3. Every corporation and every officerof a corporation who receives, in respect of
any trade or commerce between Canada and Cuba, any directives, instructions,
intimations of policy or other communications relating to an extraterritorial
measure of the United States from a person who is in a position to direct or
influence the policies of the corporation in Canada shall give notice thereof to
the Attorney General of Canada.
Prohibition
4. No corporation shall comply with an extraterritorial measure of the United
States in respect of trade or commerce between Canada and Cuba or with any
directives, instruction, intimations of policy or other communications relating
thereto that are received from a person who is in a position to direct or influence
the policies of the corporation in Canada.
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 1992, 124 C. Gaz. SOR/90-751
(Can.).
269. Id.
270. 1980, ch. 11 (Eng).
271. United Kingdom's Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Cuban Assets Control
Regulations) Order, 1992 No. 2449, Statutory Instruments (Oct. 14, 1992).
272. Mexico to Punish Firms That Obey US Rule, J. COM., Dec. 4, 1992, at A4, availa-
ble in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JCM File.
273. One commentator argues that if there is a conflict with the laws of the host state,
the United States should simply refine the application of its laws. See Zipper, supra note 11,
at 1066-67. However, this approach misses the difference in approaches between the Second
and the Third Restatement. See supra notes 185-206 and accompanying text. Under the
Third Restatement, if the conflict is severe, then as a matter of law the United States has
no jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 172, § 403
reporters' note 10.
274. Cf. Jan Malia Lundelius, Comment, Reaction Sanctions and Foreign Incorporated
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continue trading with Cuba, thereby subjecting their parent corpo-
rations to possible U.S. civil 75 and criminal liability27 for violating
the CDA, or they can discontinue trade with Cuba altogether, sub-
jecting themselves to criminal and civil liability under the foreign
states' laws. 2" Although democratizing Cuba may be an excep-
tional case, an application of the three factors under section
414(2)(b) as well as the restrictive language of the section demon-
strates that the CDA regulation of foreign subsidiaries is unreason-
able under international law.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT'S
EXTRATERRITORIAL PROHIBITION
Notwithstanding the prohibition's direct conflict with interna-
tional law, the CDA's prohibitions also fail to promote a rational
U.S. foreign policy. The CDA's principle objective is to bring about
a peaceful democratization of Cuba278 by eliminating Cuba's U.S.
foreign subsidiary trade to end the Castro government.2 79 But the
policy is, in fact, irrational. As a report by the Inter-American Dia-
logue correctly stated:
We find no good evidence, however, to sustain the argument
that such a hard-line policy would provoke positive change in
Cuba .... [The hard-line policy] would also communicate con-
tinuing U.S. hostility to the people of Cuba. We reject this op-
tion as shortsighted, costly for the people of Cuba, and probably
Subsidiaries: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 1 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 35 (1985) (dis-
cussing the problems that two U.S. subsidiaries, Dresser France and Sensor Nederland faced
after the Reagan Administration prevented exports for the Euro-Siberian pipeline under the
Export Administration Act of 1979).
275. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 16(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
276. Id. § 16(a).
277. See Leyton-Brown, supra note 79, at 191-92. Section 16(a) provides that:
Whoever shall willfully violate any of the provisions of this Act ... shall, upon
conviction, be fined ... or if a natural person, be fined .... or imprisoned ... ;
and the officer, director, or agent of any corporation who knowingly partici-
pants [sic] in such violation shall, upon conviction, be fined ... or imprisoned.
.. or both.
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 16(a) (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
The language of this statute is open-ended. "Whoever" is not defined, and could be any
person, including the foreign subsidiary or employees thereof, over whom the United States
may obtain jurisdiction.
278. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6001(6) & (8) (West Supp. 1993).
279. See 137 CONG. REC. H8763 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Florida Rep.
Smith).
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counterproductive. s
Reports since 1989 strongly suggest that the embargo has been
remarkably effective at perpetuating the suffering of the Cuban
people. 8' In today's Cuba, all food is rationed and people do not
always receive their rationed share.2 82 Food is so scarce, in fact,
that Cuban officials moved thousands of city dwellers to the coun-
tryside, in an effort to bolster food production .28  Even Cuba's fa-
mous cigars are rationed. 84
The Austerity Program, initiated in 1990, best exemplifies the
average Cuban's plight. This program resulted in:
Drastic rationing of gasoline and fuel oil to both the state and
private sectors; sharp reduction in bus transportation; use of
700,000 or more bicycles for personal transportation; substitu-
tion of some 400,000 draft animals for trucks, tractors, and
combines.
Reduction of the work week to five days; reassignment of
surplus Communist Party workers to more "productive" jobs in
industry and agriculture; reduction in the hours of plant opera-
tion in various industries;[ ]and the closing down of a nickel-
processing plant and oil refinery.
Inclusion of an additional 180 consumer goods and 28 food
items to the list of rationed items; and the halting of construc-
tion of new schools, day-care centers, and urban housing.
2 85
Because food and medicine comprise most of the U.S. foreign sub-
sidiary trade with Cuba, the current plight of the average citizen of
Cuba, as evidenced by the Austerity Program, will only worsen
under the CDA.2 86
The U.S. plan seeks to move Cuba to democracy by worsening
Cuba's already bleak situation.28 7 This expectation, however, is ill-
conceived. A democracy which makes Cubans hungrier will not
280. INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE TASK FORCE ON CUBA, CUBA IN THE AMERICAS: RECIPRO-
CAL CHALLENGES 7 (1992) (available from the Aspen Institute in Washington D.C.).
281. See sources cited supra note 13.
282. Let Them Eat Coconuts, supra note 13.
283. Linda Robinson, Castro's New Revolution: As Soviet Subsidies Dwindle, Cuba's
Leader Is Sending His Disgruntled People Back to the Land, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 24, 1991, at 38.
284. Stoic to the Last, supra note 13.
285. GONZALEZ & RONFELDT, supra note 94, at 4 (citations omitted).
286. See KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 68, at 11.
287. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6001 (West Supp. 1993).
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bring democracy to Cuba. As one Cuban-American expert noted,
"no regime falls when people are spending twenty hours a day
thinking about how to find food. If anything happens in Cuba, it
will happen only when things improve. '288 Even the dissidents in
Cuba realize this is true.289 Further, if the CDA's expectations were
realized and impoverished Cubans miraculously rose somehow to
protest against the Cuban government, they would merely be met
by an even stronger response of political repression.2 9 In short, the
CDA merely aggravates impoverishment and perpetuates the im-
balance of power in Cuba-it neither attracts nor encourages dem-
ocratic principles.
The CDA will force Cubans to protest against Castro, even
288. Tom Carter, Some Say U.S. Embargo Keeps Castro in Power, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
9, 1992, at A9; see also Mimi Whitefield, Energy Diet Leaves Cuba Run-Down, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 27, 1992, at Al, A9 (quoting Harvard Cuban Specialist Jorge Dominguez, who
stated that "increasing economic hardship makes the politics of opposition more difficult").
In fact, testimony to this effect was presented to the .House Committee on Foreign
Affairs:
[D]espite the increasingly harsh material conditions of life, 'and in large part
because most ordinary citizens right now are consumed by the daily struggle for
survival, the Castro regime is not disintegrating. People are not focusing on
politics right now. They are focusing on survival.
Cuban Democracy Act House Hearings 1992, supra note 1, 103 (statement of Enrique
Baloyra, Representative, Cuban Democratic Party); see also Cuban Democracy Act House
Hearings 1992, supra note 1, at 541, 544 (prepared statement of Ernesto F. Betancourt)
("Individuals struggling to survive in the face of massive shortages are unlikely to have
spare time and energy to engage in revolutionary activities.").
289. See Tim Golden, 'Down With Fidel!' Is Heard in Cuba, But There Is No Sign Yet
of His Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1993, at A10.
290. The Cuban regime deploys block committees, electronic surveillance, and rapid-
response brigades to intimidate political and ideological dissidents. Mark Falcoff, Is Cuba
Next?, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1992, at 42; see also GONZALEZ & RONFELDT, supra note 94, at 13;
Luis E. Aguilar, Castro's Last Stand, Can Cuba Be Freed Without a Bloodbath?, POLICY
REVIEW, Summer 1990, at 75; Damian Fraser, Cuban Revolutionary in An Army Green Bus-
iness Suit: Castro Is Courting Capital-Not Capitalism, FIN. TIMES, July 14, 1992, at 4.
For example, Elizardo Sfnchez Santa Cruz, Cuba's most prominent and often-jailed
human rights activist, was besieged only recently by a rapid action brigade after speaking
against the Cuban government. One reporter described the ambush:
The mob, estimated to number between three hundred and five hundred, de-
stroyed his garage, where he did his work, and the files and furniture inside. It
tried to break down the back door of his house but couldn't, because the door
was reinforced with steel bars. It broke the windows and threw pots of paint and
bottles of ink at the walls. It called for Sfnchez to come out and face his accus-
ers. The mob was directed by police, and they called for Sfnchez to come out so
that they could protect him.
John Newhouse, A Reporter At Large-Socialism or Death, NEW YORKER, Apr. 27, 1992, at
56; see also Howard W. French, Castro Meets Dissent with an Iron Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
8, 1991, at 3 (reporting on the abduction and imprisonment of dissident Cuban poet Maria
Elena Cruz Varela).
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though the United States and the world community are aware that
retribution for such protests will be swift and painful.29 1 In es-
sence, CDA prohibitions irrationally force Cubans to make a Hob-
son's choice: starve or face Castro's iron fist.
A report on Cuban Human Rights prepared for the United




While the report did not specifically refer to the United States, it
noted that international sanctions against Cuba "'[were] totally
counterproductive if it is the international community's purpose to
improve the human rights situation.' ",293 The report crystallizes
what should be obvious: Cuba's only viable option, apart from ca-
pitulating to outside pressure, is to "continue [its] desperate ef-
forts to stay anchored in the past.
'29 4
Dissidents within Cuba agree with the United Nations' posi-
tion. Elizardo SAfnchez Santa Cruz stated, "[tihere is a real danger
of national tragedy on the horizon. Cuba is a volcano waiting to
explode. 2 95 The prominent leaders of the human rights and dissi-
dent movements within Cuba have also demonstrated their disdain
for the embargo, signing a "Declaration of Goodwill" to oppose the
CDA in favor of diplomacy and discussion between the two coun-
tries.296 Congress, however, has ignored these pleas, and voted for
an Act that, according to Representative David Nagle, could foster
civil violence in Cuba297 and a new wave of Cuban immigration,
291. See Cuban Democracy Act House Hearings 1992, supra note 1, at 201-12; Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Ambassador Caro-Johan Broth's findings
contained within his interim report on the Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, U.N. Doc.
A/47/625, Nov. 19, 1992 [hereinafter Special Rapporteur].
292. Special Rapporteur, supra note 291, at 22.
The United Nations adopted a resolution which called upon Cuba:
to cease the persecution and punishment of citizens for reasons related to free-
dom of expression and peaceful association, to permit legalization of indepen-
dent groups, to respect guarantees of due process, to permit access to the prisons
by national independent groups and international humanitarian agencies, to re-
view sentences for crimes of a political nature; and to cease retaliatory measures
towards those seeking permission to leave the country.
Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, G.A. Res. 139, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. 49, at
215, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
293. Special Rapporteur, supra note 291, at 22.
294. Id.
295. Simon Tisdall, Cuba's Kissing Cousin; Clinton's Administration is At A Cross-
roads on Cuba. Either It Can Drive Castro's Government to Collapse or It Can Forge a
New and Mutually Beneficial Alliance, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, GUARDN File.
296. Cuban Democracy Act House Hearings 1992, supra note 1, at 164-65.
297. See also Andrew Zimbalist, Teetering on the Brink: Cuba's Current Economic
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reminiscent of the Mariel Boat Lift, toward the United States.2 98
Furthermore, the United States has overestimated Cuban de-
sire to adopt a democratic system. While many Cubans want
change, Cubans on the island fear democracy. As one reporter
noted: "Thirty-four years after the triumph of the revolution,
Cubans live between encroaching walls of worry. They fear nothing
will change soon to improve their decaying existence. Yet they also
fear the ground will suddenly shift, drawing them into a maelstrom
of post-Castro pain.
299
The Castro government plays on these fears, emphasizing the
unsuccessful changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. The Cuban people learn that eighty percent of the people
in the former Soviet Union have plunged into poverty, while Boris
Yeltsin struggles with the Russian Congress for control of the
country.300 As Castro remarked in a speech: "You are already wit-
nessing what those countries which used to call themselves socialist
are now going through: millions of unemployed, inequality, injus-
tice. They were offered miracles . . . and what they got instead is
the other side of the coin."30 1
Many Cubans appreciate the Revolution. In fact, entire classes
of Cubans profess that they "owe everything they are and every-
thing they have to the Castro regime." 02 These include both the
common workers, many of whom received redistributed property
and higher socioeconomic status as a result of the revolution and
the elites who fear retribution or displacement from exiles.3 03 Non-
whites in Cuba, who make up more than sixty percent of the popu-
lation,304 especially fear the downfall of Castro; they perceive that
it would eviscerate racial equality.30 5 Thus, the U.S. policy over-
estimates many Cubans' desire to embrace democracy and under-
and Political Crisis, 24 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 407, 417 (1992) (noting that the outcome of the
U.S. policy could be a civil war in Cuba with tens of thousands of deaths).
298. See Cuban Democracy Act House Hearings 1992, supra note 1, at 201-12.
299. Peter Slevin, Cubans Ambivalent About The Future, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 7, 1993,
at Al.
300. Golden, supra note 289.
301. GONZALEZ & RONFELDT, supra note 94, at 19 n.32.
302. Falcoff, supra note 290, at 43.
303. GONZALEZ & RONFELDT, supra note 94, at 20.
304. Slevin, supra note 299, at A16; cf. Zimbalist, supra note 297, at 416 (estimating
the percentage of the Cuban population who are black or mulatto between 40% to 50%).
305. Slevin, supra note 299, at A16; Aguilar, supra note 290, at 76; Falcoff, supra note
290, at 43.
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estimates their appreciation for what socialism has given them. 06
As one analyst declared, even as economic conditions deteriorate,
"the size of the force ready to defend Castro, Cuban nationalism
and the social gains of the revolution will always remain substan-
tial and formidable.)9
07
Several analysts suggest that increasing the embargo's severity
will actually strengthen Castro.308 Foreign economic sanctions pro-
vide "ammunition" to the target government to rally political sup-
port and morale against external pressure. 0 9 Hence, the very eco-
nomic sanctions designed to overthrow the target government can
actually strengthen that government.310
Prior to the CDA, the Cuban people had just one person to
blame for Cuba's economic crisis, Fidel Castro.311 Today, the Cas-
tro regime blames the United States for the island's economic cri-
sis.3"2 Thus, many Cubans do not look to the United States for
solutions, but rather blame them for their troubles.13 This prob-
lem is compounded by Cuban fear that the downfall of Castro will
be accompanied by the reimposition of U.S. influence upon the
island.
314
The CDA also penalizes U.S. business, and it does so in two
ways. First, the CDA proscribes U.S. foreign subsidiaries from
trading food or medicine with Cuba. 15 Yet, since most of Cuban
306. See Cuddy, supra note 141.
307. Zimbalist, supra note 297, at 417.
308. Douglas Farah, Castro Uses Stiffer U.S. Embargo to Justify Economic Straits,
WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1992, at Al; David Haskel, U.S. Anti-Cuba Law is Doomed Electoral
Ploy, Experts Say, REUTERS, Oct. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER
File (quoting Rachel Neild of the private group Washington Office on Latin America).
309. Kenneth W. Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals: Foreign Policy Export
Controls in the 1970s and 1980s, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739, 814 (1981).
310. Id.
311. Haskel, supra note 308.
312. Id. As one of the leading Cuban dissidents noted, "[tihis [law] has just strength-
ened Castro's only argument to continue his intransigent position.... The law is repudiated
by everyone here, and that is logical. It will have the opposite effect of what was intended."
Farah, supra note 308, at Al (brackets in original) (quoting Vladimiro Roca, the son of a
revolutionary hero and now a leading dissident).
313. Russell Warren Howe, Fidel's Little Hell: Cuba Without Libre-or Coffee, WASH.
POST, June 27, 1993, at C3; Robert Mott, Cuba Revisited-Inching Toward Reconciliation,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SACBEE File.
314. Cuban Democracy Act House Hearings 1992, supra note 1, at 546 (prepared state-
ment of Ernesto F. Betancourt).
315. An amendment offered by New York's Representative Ted Weiss (D.), which
would have "allowed U.S. companies to sell food to the Cuban government for humanitarian
purposes," was defeated by voice vote. David Masci, House Panel Moves To Tighten Eco-
1993]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1
imports from U.S. subsidiaries is food and medicine, 16 Cuba will
simply buy these necessities from non-U.S. subsidiaries.3 17 "U.S.
subsidiaries, not Castro, [become] the loser." ' s
But not only do U.S. subsidiaries suffer; U.S. companies suffer
as well.3 19 United States companies suffer directly under the em-
bargo because they are prevented trade with Cuba. The case of
food illustrates this point. One study "estimated that between 1965
and 1986, the embargo cost the United States nearly $2 billion in
lost export sales of corn, cotton, potatoes, rice, wheat, wheat flour,
dry milk and poultry." ' Given this tremendous opportunity cost,
that the United States does not export food to Cuba is curious,
especially in light of what the Administrator of the Foreign Agri-
culture Service of the Department of Agriculture said in 1989:
Export limitations on agricultural commodities have been em-
ployed by the United States half a dozen times over the last few
decades. However, none of the export controls for foreign policy
or national security purposes has appreciably reduced the total
flow of agricultural imports to the target country. 2'
The CDA will also devastate agricultural commodities trad-
nomic Sanctions on Cuba, 50 CONG. Q. 1619 (1992). Representative Weiss offered another
amendment to allow the sale of medicine and medical equipment to the Cuban government.
This amendment was effectively killed by another amendment offered by Representative
Torricelli which would allow such medical sales "only if the U.S. government could verify,
through on-site inspections, that the supplies would not be re-exported or misused for pur-
poses of torture." According to Weiss, this amendment set impossible conditions on the sale
of the medical equipment since U.S. on site inspections in Cuba "'can't happen and won't
happen.'" Id.
316. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
317. Smith, supra note 114; H.R. REP. No. 615, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 20 (1992)
(dissenting views of the Honorable Doug Bereuter).
One could argue that Cuba will not be able to turn to other companies for trade since
the CDA also contains a section which encourages the President to encourage other govern-
ments to restrict their trade and credit relations with Cuba. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6003(a) (West
Supp. 1993). However, in light of the harsh foreign disapproval of the bill and Clinton's
recent signaling of better relations with Cuba, the author does not consider this a possibil-
ity. See infra notes 332-37, 348-50 and accompanying text.
318. Smith, supra note 114.
319. Abbott, supra note 309, at 826-38 (discussing the economic costs of export controls
to U.S. businesses because of lost transactions and unpredictability).
320. Cuban Democracy Act House Hearings 1992, supra note 1, at 216 (prepared state-
ment of the Honorable Bill Alexander member of the United States House of
Representatives).
321. Id. at 213 (statement of Rep. Alexander quoting Tom Kay, Administrator of the
Foreign Agriculture Service of the Department of Agriculture).
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ers.2 Commodities traders deal with direct and string trades.23 In
a string trade, traders may buy and resell a commodity several
times before its ultimate destination is established.3 2 4 Under the
former licensing requirement, if Cuba were involved in any part of
this trade, no matter how far removed, the U.S. firm had to obtain
a license from OFAC,325 even where there were no direct business
contact between the U.S. firm and Cuba or even if there was no
foreseeable Cuban participation in the string trade. 26 Without the
ability to obtain a license, U.S. firms would be forced to withdraw
from world commodity markets for human necessities-sugar,
wheat, corn, and vegetable oils. 3 17 Logically, excluding U.S. firms
from these types of transactions does not democratize Cuba.
Secondly, because other nations have enacted CDA-blocking
legislation,3 2 8 U.S. foreign subsidiaries must either violate the host
country's blocking law or the U.S. parent company must violate
the Trading with the Enemy Act.329 This places subsidiaries in an
irreconcilable position.330 Additionally, it puts the directors of the
parent and subsidiary corporations in an untenable situation.331 By
322. See H.R. REP. No. 615, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 20 (1992) (dissenting views of
the Honorable Doug Bereuter).
323. William R. Pearce, Vice Chairman of the Board Cargill, Incorporated, Address
before the House Ways and Means Committee Trade Subcommittee 2 (Apr. 20, 1992) (tran-
script available from University of Miami Inter-American Law Review Office).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 2.
327. Id. at 3. Forcing the United States to pull out of the commodities markets is espe-
cially devastating to companies at this time. With the collapse of the markets in Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, Cuba is more dependent on world commodity markets. UNITED
STATES EcONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA, supra note 12, at 132. For example, now that
sugar sales will no longer be made to the Soviet Union, Cuba's sugar will have to be sold on
the world market. Id. at 132. According to one estimate, if sugar sales were allowed, the
value would be over one billion dollars. Id. at 132.
328. See supra note 267 and text accompanying notes 267-72.
329. Pearce, supra note 323, at 5; see also H.R. REP. No. 615, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
at 19-20 (1992) (dissenting views of the Honorable Doug Bereuter).
Although there have been no prosecutions to date, it has been reported that the Cana-
dian Justice Department is investigating twenty cases of violations of Canada's anti-em-
bargo law. See Peter Benesh, Canadian Trade with Cuba Growing; U.S. Embargo Is Help-
ing By Pushing Business Opportunities North, STAR TRIaUNE, Aug. 16, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, STRIB File.
330. See H.R. REP. No. 615, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 20 (1992) (dissenting views of
the Honorable Doug Bereuter).
331. See Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 16(a) (West Supp. 1993)
(stating that a U.S. director who knowingly participates in a violation faces up to a $100,000
or imprisonment for ten years or both); Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States)
Order, 1992, 124 C. Gaz. SOR/90-751 (Can.) (stating that officers who violate the order face
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placing U.S. business in this position, the United States, not Cuba,
suffers. United States business, rather than Cuba, bears the final
backlash of the CDA.
By passing the CDA, the United States has alienated its allies,
as well as the international community. On November 24, 1992, the
United Nations 32 denounced the extraterritorial aspects of the
CDA by a vote of fifty-nine to three (seventy-one abstentions).,s3
The European Community has threatened to file a complaint
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade3 4 regarding
the CDA.33 5 Latin America, which strongly opposed the U.S. em-
bargo of Cuba, has been even more hostile to the CDA, which
strengthens that embargo.3 ' This international dissension could
result in problems similar to those which the United States exper-
ienced prior to its licensing scheme in July 29, 1975.337 If the Presi-
dent tries to enforce § 6003(a), by encouraging countries that pres-
ently trade with Cuba to restrict their trade,3 this foreign
disapproval could only stiffen.
up to five years in prison and a fine of up to ten thousand dollars.)
The situation can be even worse for the directors of European companies. Under Euro-
pean law, the directors have an affirmative duty to carry out their duties in the best inter-
ests of the company. Harold H. Tittman, Extra-territorial Application to U.S. Export Con-
trol Laws on Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Corporations: An American Lawyer's View from
Europe, 16 INT'L LAW. 730-35 (1982). Therefore, if the directors voted to cut off trade to
Cuba at the bequest of the controlling shareholder, U.S. parent corporation, the directors
could become subject to "civil actions by creditors, employees or minority shareholders, and
possibly even criminal proceedings." Id. at 736.
332. Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed
By The United States of America Against Cuba, G.A. Res. 19, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at 339, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
333. Id. at 20; see also supra note 12.
334. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. (5), (6), 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (1950).
335. See EC Warns It May Complain to GATT If Cuba Embargo Expansion Is Ap-
proved, INT'L TRADE REP., Oct. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTRAD File;
EC Warns Bush Not To Ban U.S. Subsidiaries' Cuba Sales, REUTERS Oct. 8, 1992 available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
Some commentators have suggested that the original United States embargo of Cuba
violates GATT. See UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA, supra note 12, at
319-22; Shneyer & Barta, supra note 6, at 474-75.
336. See Resolution of the Latin American Parliament, A/46/193/Add.1 (August 27,
1991), reprinted in UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA, supra note 12, at
333-34 (expressing solidarity with the people of Cuba and asking for an end to the thirty
year old economic and trade blockade); see also Latin Leaders Ask End of Embargo on
Cuba, supra note 12 (stating that the leaders of Latin America, Spain and Portugal called
for an end to the thirty-one-year-old United States embargo against Cuba).
337. See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
338. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6003(a) (West Supp. 1993).
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Part of the anger of our allies and the rest of the world is
rooted in the United States' inconsistency when it comes to its pol-
icy regarding the regulation of foreign subsidiaries." 9 The United
States, which emphatically asserts that the CDA's prohibition
against foreign subsidiaries trading with Cuba is legal under inter-
national law, is also the United States which has adopted blocking-
legislation to prohibit U.S. businesses from participating in the
Arab Boycott of Israel. 3 0 As the Senate Report noted:
[T]he committee strongly believes that the United States
should not acquiesce in attempts by foreign governments
through secondary and tertiary boycotts to embroil American
citizens in their battles against others by forcing them to par-
ticipate in actions which are repugnant to American values
and traditions. Accordingly, the bill reported by the committee
directly attacks attempts to interfere with American affairs...
[Floreign nations would be put on notice that the U.S. Govern-
ment will not tolerate such interference with its sovereignty.3 41
In simplest terms, it is this undisguised hypocrisy which infuriates
the international community.
VII. PLOTTING A COURSE FOR THE FUTURE
The spirit behind the CDA is correct. The rapid decline in
subsidized trade between the Soviet Union and Cuba presents an
opportunity for change in Cuba. But the CDA will not realize such
change. Most authorities and analysts advise that, to bring about
change in Cuba, a combination of the following should be enacted:
339. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, ". .Sauce for the Gander": The Arab Boycott and
United States Political Trade Controls, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 25 (1977) (comparing the prac-
tices of the Arab League and those of the United States with reference to trade boycotts);
Kill Castro With Kindness, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 3, 1992, at C12, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, HTCOUR File (noting the hypocrisy of the U.S. action toward Cuba and
U.S. policy-makers and lawmakers opposition to the secondary boycotts against Israel).
340. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235
(1977) (amending the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1970)).
Title II of the Act prohibits U.S. companies from complying with foreign boycotts. See Pres-
ton L. Greene, Jr., The Arab Economic Boycott of Israel: The International Law Perspec-
tive, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 77 (1978) (examining "the effects and implications of the
Arab boycott upon existing and evolving norms of contemporary international law"); Robert
S. Wayne, Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Amendments
of 1977, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 741 (1978) (discussing the anti-boycott regulations of the
Export Administration Amendments of 1977 and their application to United States
subsidiaries).
341. S. REP. No. 95-104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-18 (1977) (emphasis added).
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(1) increase the flow of information to Cuba through increased
mail service, phone service, as well as allowing U.S. citizens and
tourists to travel to Cuba; 42 (2) take all possible steps toward re-
ducing Cuba's fear of a U.S. military attack;34 3 (3) make it easier
for food and medicine to be delivered to Cuba;344 and, most impor-
tant, (4) begin diplomatic discussions with Cuba.
34 5
Such a program has the benefit of flexibility.34  If the Castro
government responds positively to these efforts, then the United
States can reciprocate in kind. Alternatively, the United States can
tighten provisions in response to negative signals from Cuba.
3 47
Secondly, this program has the benefit of focusing attention
upon Castro and his government, rather than the United States.
Under this alternative, the world would pressure Castro, not the
United States, to change its policies. Presently, the United States
and anachronistic policy, evidenced by the CDA, occupy the
world's attention.
VIII. SIGNS OF HOPE
Despite the CDA, there are reasons to believe that the U.S.
government's position is becoming more reasonable. The Clinton
administration has taken several steps to indicate that its policy
toward Cuba is changing. First, the Clinton administration has re-
iterated that the United States has no hostile intentions toward
Cuba. 4s The Treasury Department has rewritten some of the
travel regulations to Cuba, which will open up expanded visits by
educational and religious groups, professionals, art dealers, and
342. See UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA, supra note 12, at 172
(quoting the U.S. Army War College Report which cited a consensus of experts from the
defense, foreign policy, intelligence, and academic communities); INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
TASK FORCE ON CUBA, supra note 256, at 6; GONZALEZ & RONFELDT, supra note 94, at 80-81;
Jorge I. Dominguez, The Secrets of Castro's Staying Power, 1993 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 97.
343. See UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA, supra note 12, at 172
(quoting the U.S. Army War College report); INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE TASK FORCE ON
CUBA, supra note 256, at 6; GONZALEZ & RONFELDT, supra note 94, at 81-82; Dominguez,
supra note 342.
344. See UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA, supra note 12, at 172
(quoting the U.S. Army War College report); INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE TASK FORCE ON
CUBA, supra note 256, at 7.
345. See INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE TASK FORCE ON CUBA, supra note 256, at 6-7;
346. Cuban Democracy Act House Hearings 1992, supra note 1, at 548-49.
347. Id. at 548.
348. Christopher Marquis, U.S. Policy Toward Cuba Softening, CALGARY HERALD, Aug.
13, 1993, at A26, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CALHER File.
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publishers." 9 Further, the administration is considering phone ser-
vice expansion into Cuba. 50
In addition, there are signs that Cuba itself is changing. Fidel
Castro has released four leading dissidents from jail. 51 Castro has
allowed Elizardo S~nchez to embark on a speaking tour-outside
Cuba.352 Finally, Castro offered to talk about drug interdiction and
compensation for U.S. assets seized during the Revolution. 5 s
The United States should seize this opportunity for change
and execute the steps of the policy recommended by the ana-
lysts.3 5 If the United States does not, the Cuban people may re-
gret that choice for decades.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although the Cold War is over, one would not recognize it by
U.S. policy toward Cuba. The U.S. Cold War stance toward Cuba
is best evidenced by the CDA. Rather than adopt a policy of recon-
ciliation with Cuba, the United States has adopted a systematic
policy of hostility. This policy penalizes the Cuban people and U.S.
businesses, who might otherwise be meaningful vehicles for demo-
cratic change, while concurrently strengthening Castro.
The ban on U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba is the
most counter-productive provision of the CDA. When originally
enacted, this prohibition lead to serious conflicts with foreign gov-
ernments.3 55 Those governments, as well as the Third Restate-
ment, view this type of regulation as illegal under international
law. Yet, no one has challenged this statutory ban in court. Until
such a challenge is mounted, a change in U.S. policy-to promote
reason, consistency, and meaningful democratic change-appears
to be Cuba's only hope.
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